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USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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14 June 1984

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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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INTERNATIONAL

GUATEMALAN CP CHIEF INTERVIEWED ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC SITUATION

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 2, Feb 84 pp 36-47

[Interview with Carlos Gonzalez, general secretary of the Guatemalan Labor Party (GPT) Central Committee, by LATINSKAYA AMERIKA correspondent: "Guatemala: The Resistance of the Masses Is Increasing"; date and place not specified]

[Text] This journal's correspondent met with Carlos Gonzalez, the general secretary of the Guatemalan Labor Party (GPT) Central Committee, and asked him to talk about the situation within the country and the struggle of the left-wing forces.

[Question] Our publications devote a great deal of space to Guatemala. In 1982 alone there appeared six large batches of materials--articles by Soviet authors, translations, and interviews with representatives of revolutionary organizations.¹ Nevertheless, it is far from simple to keep up with the course of events in the sub-region as a whole, and in Guatemala in particular. Over a period of less than a year and a half two coups occurred in the country, moreover, under conditions whereby the military was ruling the the country without any controls, on an institutional basis established by themselves. How do you explain this?

[Answer] Primarily by a deepening of the structural crisis, by an increase in the armed struggle of the people's revolutionary organizations, a strengthening of the conflicts among the ruling classes, and a number of other factors, in particular, those of a religious nature.

During the 1970's there was a sharp increase in the influx into Guatemala of foreign capital; this reflected the interested concern of the imperialist circles in modernizing its backward socio-economic structures, strengthening their own positions in the country by means of this, and enhancing their profits. Whereas the military governments which replaced each other in power were continuing to orient themselves toward the latifundistas [big landowners], the industrial-financial and trade bourgeoisie were growing and becoming stronger; their interests were far from completely being expressed by these governments. This was also one of the causes of the military putsch of 23 March 1982, which brought General Rios Montt to power.

Rios Montt set for himself these two goals: to achieve a consensus between the principal factions of the ruling classes and the army, as well as to put an

end to the people's armed struggle. One of the means which he attempted to apply was the process of "democratization," developing, so to speak, in tandem with the suppression of "violence," or the so-called plan of "rifles and beans." "Democratization," about which the government demagogues used to blather a great deal, was a purely propagandistic trick. The fact that in certain motion-picture theaters Soviet films were shown, such as "Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears" while in the bookstores even Marxist literature began to be sold, was supposed to create merely the appearance of a "free exchange of ideas."

And, indeed, Rios Montt's regime constituted a reactionary military dictatorship under which basic human rights were constantly being violated, workers could not band together into trade unions, the leaders of popular movements were subjected to repressions and terror, and many hundreds of patriots disappeared without a trace. The censorship meticulously sifted through all information about events in the larger world as well as about what was going on within the country.

However, even the showy-type "democratization" weakened the shaky positions of Rios Montt, which were unfirm even without this; their rickety quality was exacerbated by the acute worsening of the economic situation.

[Question] Could you dwell on this question in more detail and cite specific indicators of Guatemala's socio-economic development in recent years?

[Answer] I have certain data received by our specialists, based on official statistics, both national and international. I will cite the most important of these data, which, in our opinion, testify to the fact that at the present time the country is undergoing the severest crisis of its entire history.

In 1978 the increase of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) amounted to 5 percent. In 1980 this indicator went down to 3.8 percent; in 1981 the amount of the GDP not only failed to increase but, on the contrary, declined by 1 percent. In 1982 this reduction already amounted to 3 percent. According to our calculations the very same thing occurred in 1983 also. If, moreover, one takes into account the annual growth rate of the population at 3 percent, then the rate of relative decline in the GDP would be even more devastating.

A sharp decline of production activity is to be observed in all sectors of the economy. In particular, this is expressed in the closing down and liquidation of many industrial, commercial, and agricultural enterprises. As compared with 1982, the total value of goods and services in 1983 declined by 16 percent. The deficit in the balance of trade in 1981 amounted to 650 million dollars; it was caused primarily by the decline in prices on agricultural products, which are the main items of export. Private capital investments during this same year amounted to 218 million dollars (in 1978 this figure was 373 million dollars). And, although state investments did increase somewhat, they could not exert a stimulating influence on economic development. All this led to a sharp reduction in the country's currency reserves--from 745 million dollars in 1978 to 47.4 million dollars in March 1982.

According to the calculations of specialists from the Faculty of Economics of San Carlos University, the real value of the quetzal in 1982, as compared to

1972, amounted to only 36 centavos, i.e., 36 percent. In one of the studies conducted in this country all strata of the population are divided into the following three categories: "extremely poor" (with a monthly family income of less than 150 quetzales), "relatively poor," and "not poor." In accordance with the results of these studies, 51.3 percent of families were relegated to the first category, 25.6 percent to the second, and the remainder to the third. This means that approximately 80 percent of Guatemalans live under conditions of poverty!

Among the most depressing social indicators the following could be cited. Full and partial unemployment encompasses almost 1.5 million persons, or approximately 40 percent of the economically active population. Reduction of the workers' income leads to a lessening of their purchasing power, which, in turn, narrows down the capacity of the domestic market and retards the development of industry. Out of 7.5 million Guatemalans, 3 million do not have normal housing. According to UNESCO data, 23.3 percent of children have the opportunity to attend school for up to 3 years, and 13 percent--for up to 6 years. As a result, approximately 82 percent of Guatemalans are completely or partially illiterate. Social insurance encompasses only 34 percent of the economically active population.

The average life span in this country does not exceed 45 years. We have only 110 hospitals, 30 of which are private. On an average, a Guatemalan can go to see a physician once every 2.5 years, and only 17 children out of 100 receive an annual medical check-up. Infant mortality is the highest in the world; out of every 100 new births only 10 live to the age of 5. In documents of the Latin American Institute of Nutrition it is noted that a Guatemalan on the average consumes only a third of the nutritional products necessary to him. Indicators cited by the UN testify to the fact that 62 percent of the urban and 80 percent of the rural population go hungry. Some 85 percent of children up to the age of 5 suffer from insufficient nutrition.

These figures speak for themselves, more than eloquently characterizing the results of the "activity" of the military governments.

Question With regard to the military coup of 23 March 1982 and the Rios Montt government, what position did the bourgeois political parties take?

Answer First of all, it is necessary to provide a brief characterization of them. The most reactionary forces of the latifundistas and the bourgeoisie linked to U.S. capital are represented by the Movement of National Liberation (MLN), the Institutional-Democratic Party (PID), the Revolutionary Party (PR), and the "Authentically Nationalistic Center" (KAN), created by one of the former dictators--General Arano Osorio. The PID, which was formed during the period of the rule by Peralta Asurdia (1963--1966), has been in power several times with the support of the PR, the revolutionary nature of which is in name only. The rise and activities of these political organizations, which express --in addition to the interests of the latifundistas and the bourgeoisie--the will of various factions of the military and state bureaucracy is, at the same time, testimony to the growth of conflicts and divergences of opinion among individual groups of the ruling classes.

The following could be relegated to the centrist organizations: the recently formed Party of National Renewal (PNR), the Christian Democratic Party (CDP), the Social Democratic United Front of Revolution (FUR), and the reformist Social Democratic Party (PSD). All these organizations, existing under various conditions--ranging from legal to underground--were critical of the Rios Montt regime.

Since the time of its founding in 1955 the CDP has been a political force functioning on the national level and in opposition to the rule of the military. During the course of all the election campaigns the Christian Democrats put up candidates who never achieved victory because of forgeries in the vote tabulation. It is interesting to note that in 1974 the CDP candidate was Rios Montt, who possibly (the results of the elections, naturally, were falsified) garnered the greatest number of votes at that time, but General Laugerud Garcia became president.

In recent times the FUR has been greatly weakened. This organization has its own representative in the state council. It includes prominent social figures, but because of repressions, as a result of which many of them have perished, the FUR now functions less actively. The PSD, which advocated a platform of progressive reforms, was also persecuted, and during the course of this many of its activists were killed.

The exacerbation of the conflicts within the ruling classes was revealed by the elections of 7 March 1982, which, as had to be anticipated, brought to power General Anibal Guevaru, a puppet of Lucas Garcia.² However, within only two weeks--on 23 March--Rios Montt overthrew the "legitimately" elected government, he was supported by practically all the right-wing parties and the CDP. The remaining reformist organizations came out against the coup: the PNR demanded the holding of new elections, the position of the FUR was somewhat less decisive, while the PSD condemned it so categorically that it was deprived of its legal status. Many of its leaders left the country and have continued an active struggle in emigration--in Mexico, Costa Rica, and France.

However, as it became more and more obvious that the new government not only did not intend to solve the old problems but even created new ones, even the parties which initially supported Rios Montt, gradually began to leave him.

[Question] As far as we know, Rios Montt began to have differences with certain members of the armed forces. Is this so?

[Answer] Yes, he not only failed to unite around his government the light-wing and centrist political tendencies but also provoked dissatisfaction among various army groups. Thus, on 7 June 1983 two capital newspapers--GRAFICO and PRENSA LIBRE--published the full text of an open letter by General Echeverria Vielman. This most senior member of the Guatemalan general called for the immediate holding of elections to the constituent assembly; he demanded the return to barracks of the officers who were performing the duties of civilian officials, as well as a postponement of the introduction of a tax-reform plan (it was supposed to have taken effect on 1 August 1983). Also mentioned there was the intensification of the dissension between the Protestants and the Catholics. Echeverria Vielman's declaration had widespread public

repercussions. Moreover, various political and economic factions of the ruling class received it as a call for more active opposition to the government. All this further weakened the latter's position.

Another manifestation of dissatisfaction with the policy of Rios Montt among the military services was the speech on television by the junta member, Colonel Gordillo Martinez, who had participated directly in the coup of 23 March. He expressed himself unambiguously in favor of the president's stepping down.

[Question] Is it true that the differences of a religious nature about which Echeverria Vielman spoke were clearly, to a certain degree, brought about by the fact that Rios Montt himself is a Protestant?

[Answer] The matter was somewhat more complex than that. Actually, Rios Montt belongs to the Protestant sect named "Verbo." However, as one priest has acknowledged, this sect is more a political than a religious organization. It was founded in Guatemala after the earthquake of 4 February 1976, and it soon became an influential political force. Its members include trusted followers of the former dictator. To be sure, if we take into consideration the fact that Rios Montt himself was at first a zealous Catholic, then a Mennonite, and only after this became one of the "elders" of the "Verbo" sect, the sincerity of his religious convictions cannot help but evoke doubts.

No matter what the case, it is true that during the period of his rule the positions of the Protestants in the country were significantly strengthened. This was connected not only with the fact that the president was a member of their ranks and encouraged the enforced conversion of inhabitants of entire villages to the new faith, but also with the loss among the people of faith in the Catholic Church, or, to be more exact, in its higher hierarchy. We must not forget, in this connection, the aid which has been rendered to the Guatemalan Protestants by sects from the United States and--to a lesser extent--those of Western Europe. At present about 27 percent of Guatemalans are of the Protestant confession.

The strengthening of religious conflicts is, however, only one aspect of the problem. Another, more important aspect is the increasingly profound awareness on the part of many priests of the injustice of the existing order, an activation of their speeches against the violence committed by the army and by bands of right-wing terrorists. This has brought about persecutions of progressive members of the clergy--dozens of them have been killed; they have disappeared without a trace, have been subjected to torture, or exiled from this country.

The Rios Montt government, in striving to utilize the religious conflicts in its own interests, merely increased the tension in society, bringing the relations between Catholics and Protestants virtually to a state of "holy" war. In this situation the Catholic episcopate, especially after the visit by Pope John-Paul II, began to oppose the dictatorship more and more. The pastoral letter of the Guatemalan bishops, published in early June 1983, was very indicative. It condemned the unrestrained militarization of the country, which has led to a reduction of outlays for social needs; the drafting into the army, primarily of Indians, who are torn away from productive labor and turned into "cannon fodder"; the growing aggressiveness of the Protestant sects; the acute worsening

of the country's socio-economic situation; as well as terrorism by the armed forces.

After the publication of this letter the government organized a public debate between one of its own representatives and a high-ranking Catholic clergyman. Thus, the Church, which had previously always supported the dictatorship--or at least kept its silence--was, for the first time, compelled to openly defend its own positions, and this also testified to the growing isolation of the Rios Montt regime.

[Question] What influence on the situation within the Church was exerted by the visit of Pope John-Paul II to Guatemala?

[Answer] First of all, it should be noted that on the very same day when the head of the Catholic Church stepped for the first time on the soil of Central America the Guatemalan Protestant dictator issued an order to shoot five of his own countrymen, despite a request by John-Paul II to commute their death sentence.

Of course, the visit added strength to the Catholics in their opposition struggle against the Protestants. Thus, the above-mentioned letter of the Guatemalan episcopate was based, for the most part, on the points of view expressed by John-Paul II at the time of his visit to Central America. And, although it condemned any violence, either by the authorities or by revolutionary organizations, it is important to note that the pope's visit strengthened the Guatemalan Catholics in the position which they took with regard to the government. The Catholic Church fully supported the coup of 8 August 1983, as a result of which General Mejia Victores--the former minister of defense in the Rios Montt government--came to power. If one recalls that Mejia Victores is a Catholic, then this position of the Church becomes fully explainable. However, its unconditional support of the new dictatorship could lead to severe consequences for it--to an ultimate loss of trust by the masses, if this regime continues the policy of repressions and genocide against its own people.

[Question] In speaking about the coup of 8 August, must we not keep in mind not only its domestic but also its foreign causes?

[Answer] Of course. This becomes particularly evident if we take into account the fact that a day prior to the coup Mejia Victores returned from a meeting with the defense ministers of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, together with representatives from the Pentagon. The reactionary governments of these states, having banded together into the so-called Central American Democratic Community, must, according to the schemes of the U.S. imperialist circles, become the main strike force in the struggle against Nicaragua and the liberation movement of El Salvador.

In striving to create the appearance of democratization in Guatemala, the Rios Montt government attempted to dissociate itself from the role imposed upon it in accordance with the aggressive intentions of the Reagan administration, directed against these countries. There is no doubt at all that such a position predetermined, to a large extent, the coup of 8 August, inasmuch as the Pentagon military clique needs a president who gives unconditional support to its

own adventuristic course. In the person of Mejia Victores the Washington strategists found the person they were looking for. Already in his first few public declarations they received assurances of his complete loyalty.

[Question] What are the most important changes which have occurred in the GPT over the last few years?

[Answer] As far back as 1969 the Fourth party congress noted the importance of unleashing a revolutionary popular war in Guatemala. In accordance with this line, our party conducted a great deal of work among the population, and, above all, among the workers. Such a course allowed us to strengthen our ties with the people, to better understand their demands, and, to a certain extent, to raise the level of the political consciousness and militancy of the masses.

Later on, the party self-critically admitted that its activity did not always correspond to the specific conditions of struggle within the country. In connection with these thoughts, it was decided to shift to other forms, as had been done by Guatemala's military-political organizations, paying particular attention to armed actions.

The year 1978 witnessed the beginning of the process of the organizational restructuring of the GPT so that it would be able to exert greater influence on the course of the revolutionary popular war and stimulate its development. This process confronted us with problems of an ideological, political, military, and particularly an organizational nature. We designated it as "reorganization of the party in accordance with the new tasks of the popular war." A large role in developing this course was played by the GPT plenums which were held in February 1981, November 1982, and May 1983. They accorded particular attention to the problem of restoring unity to all the left-wing forces in the country without exception. This problem is not a simple one; its roots go back to the 1960's, when the revolutionary movement was devastated by very powerful repressions, and it suffered great losses. It is a well-known fact that the development of events in the countries of South and Central America during the mid-1960's led to a situation whereby preference was given exclusively to armed actions. In Guatemala the foundation for this was laid by the young military-revolutionaries Ion Sosa, Tursios Lima, and others. It was precisely at that time that tendencies emerged in the revolutionary movement which subsequently led to the creation of military-political popular organizations. Many of their leaders came from the ranks of the GPT, especially from its youth wing.

The first such organization was the Insurgent Armed Forces (FAR), founded in 1963. We immediately proposed to combine forces in the general struggle, but because of a number of circumstances this was not achieved. Later on, in 1972, another military-political organization was formed--the Partisan Army of the Poor (EGP), and by the end of the 1970's the process of consolidating the Organization of Armed People (ORPA) had been completed. All of them, as well as our party, advocate the liberation of the country from imperialist domination and the overthrow of the military dictatorship.

Thus, the main thing is to have a joint goal, and life has demonstrated the necessity of combining all the revolutionary forces in order to attain it. We must come to an agreement on a number of tactical and strategic questions,

including that of an integrated revolutionary leadership. Definite progress along this path has already been noted.

As you know, in 1981 an agreement was concluded on combining all military-political revolutionary organizations into the National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala (UNRG). It included within itself the FAR, EGP, and the ORPA. The GPT is not a member of the UNRG, although it does include the so-called "Leadership Core of the GPT"--a faction which split off from the party in 1978. We consider that the creation of the UNRG is an important event in the cause of consolidating all the left-wing forces in the country; however, this process ought to be complete, without any exclusions. Therefore, we responded immediately to the UNRG's call to our party concerning the need for talks with the organizations included within it.

[Question] What is the status of the unification process as of today? Is it influenced by the fact that the UNRG includes the "Leadership Core of the GPT"?

[Answer] As I have already stated, the main thing for us is the presence among all the left-wing revolutionary-democratic organizations of a common goal: the overthrow of the dictatorship, the transfer of power to the hands of the people, the creation of a revolutionary-democratic government, expressing the interests of the broadest strata of the population and capable of carrying out radical changes, aimed at achieving independence, prosperity for the people, and peace. Therefore, we advocate further development of the unification process, as begun with the creation of the UNRG, the attraction to it of other forces striving to deepen the revolutionary popular war, and the formation of an integrated, military-political leadership, which would share in common strategic and tactical positions.

As regards our relations with the "Leadership Core of the GPT," we consider this to be an internal problem, and we advocate the restoration of party unity. Of course, the solution of this problem is not so simple, although, in principle, the November (1982) and May (1983) GPT Plenums did make an agreement possible.

Hence, while not at all encroaching upon the rights and opinions of other revolutionary organizations and not laying claim, as they say, to the role of vanguard "by definition," we are striving for just one thing--the consolidation of all forces advocating the deepening of the popular revolutionary war so they are not allowed to become fractioned up and destroyed one by one. Herein we are proceeding from the proposition that the objective conditions of the country's development correspond to precisely such a positing of the question.

[Question] It is well known that one of the factors determining the upswing of the revolutionary struggle has been the involvement in it of broad masses of Indians, who are primarily engaged in agricultural labor. In what forms is the GPT conducting work among the Indian population?

[Answer] We have already accumulated quite a bit of experience in this area. As you know, there are about 20 Indian ethnic groups living on the territory of Guatemala. Many Indians speak only their own native language. We must, therefore, take this specific into account in constructing our propagandistic, ideological, and organizational work. Thus, for example, we are translating the

most important articles and materials of party publications into the Indian dialects, and we transcribe them onto tape cassettes; and then we distribute them by means of our activists in various regions of the country.

We see with a feeling of profound satisfaction how the ideas of Marxism-Leninism are finding an increasingly widespread response among the Indians, how many of them, upon joining the party, manifest initiative and resourcefulness, in particular, on the organizational level, adapting their national traditions to the requirements of the armed struggle, helping to conduct ideological and propaganda work more effectively, drawing new fighters into the anti-dictatorship movement. Quite a bit of experience has also been accumulated by the military-political organizations, which are likewise operating successfully in the rural localities.

In certain circles one frequently hears hypocritical opinions about the virtually hostile attitude of the Indians toward the Creoles, about their untrustworthiness and deceitfulness. Of course, these are all fables, designed to justify the intolerable treatment of the Indians. In conducting a great deal of work among the Indian population, we have never encountered untrustworthiness or a lack of good will. For, of course, we have unified goals and convictions which have brought us together in a common struggle. We sincerely value their industriousness, those persistent efforts which they have made to ameliorate their lot under the extremely onerous conditions to which the military dictatorships have doomed them. In striving to draw the attention of public opinion to their situation, the Indians have conducted demonstrations, meetings, and also, for example, protest actions, such as the peaceful take-overs of the embassies of foreign powers, as happened, in particular, with the embassies of Brazil and Spain.

In order that people should know about the bloody repressions to which the completely innocent inhabitants of rural regions have been subjected, we compelled the Rios Montt government to publish the eyewitness account of a certain Indian, sympathetic to us, concerning the foul deeds of the army and the para-military terrorist bands. For this purpose we kidnapped the son of the former president, Mendez Montenegro and, as a condition for his being set free, we demanded the publication of this tragic document as well as that of the declaration by the Political Commission of the GPT Central Committee concerning our position with regard to the coup of 23 March.

[Question] It is a well-known fact that a considerable portion of the Guatemalan Army, as well as the battalions specially trained for anti-insurgency actions--the caibiles--consist, to a considerable extent, of Indians. How do you explain their participation in the war against their own people?

[Answer] Military service in Guatemala is compulsory for males who have reached the age of 18 years. Drafts into the army, particularly among the rural population, are conducted primarily by force, with the use of threats and intimidation. And, although more and more often those youths who are subject to military service are going into the partisan detachments, the remaining ones, after being mobilized, are subjected to extremely intensive ideological and psychological processing.

Thus, for example, every morning army training begins with the singing of military hymns and marches, in which mention is made of the fact that the country's main enemies are the partisans and the communists, whose struggle reflects "interests which are alien to the nation's aspirations." Anti-partisan mottoes and slogans are placed wherever possible. The consciousness and the psychology of the Guatemalan soldier throughout the entire period of his service in the army are poisoned with extremely intensive processing in the vein of "cave-man" anti-communism, by frightening him with the "communist menace."

However, despite the meticulously developed system of psychological and ideological influence, more and more soldiers and officers are arriving, during the process of anti-popular actions, to an awareness of the injustice of their own mission, to the conclusion that it is they themselves who are serving the interests of the ruling classes, interests which are alien to the people, in suppressing the just struggle of their own brothers. In contrast to the partisans --most of whom are Indians like themselves--the soldiers have neither a precise perspective nor confidence in the correctness of their own actions.

[Question] The repressions unleashed by the terrorists on the peaceful population undoubtedly have as their goal the extinction of the red heat of the revolutionary armed popular war and to frighten people. Can they count upon success at the present time with such tactics?

[Answer] As I have already stated, the defeat of the people's armed movement was one of the chief goals of the Rios Montt government, and it remains as a top-priority task of the new dictator--Mejia Victores. However, no actions--neither mass murder, torture of completely innocent persons or trickery of them, neither the burning and destruction of villages, condemnation of churches, which are turned into torture chambers or public houses, can break the resistance of the people, if unity is achieved in the anti-dictatorship struggle.

It can be stated with complete assurance that the government forces have not succeeded in gaining decisive victories over the partisans. Moreover, the insurgents themselves are waging successful operations against the army units. As we noted in the November (1982) Plenum, the armed struggle is the most dynamic element in the development of the revolutionary movement within the country. It is precisely in connection with this that the communists consider the strengthening of ties with the popular masses as one of their most important tasks.

FOOTNOTES

1. See LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1982, No 5, 7, 8, 9 (Editor's note).
2. President of Guatemala during the years 1978--1982 (Editor's note).

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COMMENTS ON CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

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[Articles: "The Christian Democratic Movement in the Political System of the Latin American Countries (Comments)"]

[Text] Hans-Gunther Stiller (GDR): "On Certain Aspects of the Development of the Christian Democratic Movement"

The discussion published in this journal concerning the role of the present-day Christian Democratic movement in Latin America* has been marked by both a profound level of analysis and a diversity of the problems encompassed, many of which during the period since elapsed have become even more urgent. In this connection, I would like to note that today a unique re-evaluation is occurring of the values and ideological positions of the region's Christian Democrats. The developing process can be understood only by proceeding from the conditions under which this trend emerged and from its objective, socio-economic functions.

The Latin American Christian Democratic movement took shape as a political trend at the time when the second phase of the general crisis of capitalism was beginning in the world; moreover, in the countries of this continent this crisis was exacerbated by their over-all backwardness and dependence. Therefore, two basic directions took form in the Christian Democratic movement from the time of its emergence. To the first of these we may relegate the political parties and factions which express the interests of the big bourgeoisie, striving to modernize capitalist relations on the basis of reformism, while retaining the institutions of "representative democracy." The second comprises those organizations and factions defending the demands of a portion of the middle classes as well as individual groups of the working class and the peasantry.

On the ideological level the first trend is an expression, an integral part, and a result of the general crisis of capitalism. In such a situation the plan for a Latin American Christian Democratic movement, reflecting the interests of the native bourgeoisie, boiled down to a development of capitalist

* See LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1982, No 1--3. [For translation, see USSR Report: Political and Sociological Affairs No 1248, JPRS 80758, 7 May 1982]

relations with the aid of the state in breadth and in depth, a concentration and centralization of capital. Thus, in contrast to Europe, bourgeois reformism in its Christian Democratic interpretation took shape on this continent under the conditions of the pre-monopolistic stage of capitalism.

Now, however, the situation on the continent has changed substantially in comparison with the period of the 1950's. The national monopolies which had been formed since the second half of the past decade--under the conditions of the deepening general as well as cyclical crisis of capitalism--began to orient themselves toward the neo-liberal economic model of the "Chicago School," about which many of the discussants have spoken. It is obvious that the Christian Democratic concept of economic development whereby a large role is relegated to the state has gradually lost influence.

This trend was reflected most vividly in the completely contradictory program and economic policy of the Herrera Campins government in Venezuela, which was mentioned in the presentation by M. M. Gurvits. Under the conditions of the pre-monopolistic stage of capitalist development (1958--mid-1970's) the COPEI was able not only to consolidate its power as one of the ruling parties but also, by relying on enormous revenues from petroleum, to implement its own course quite effectively. But today the Venezuelan Christian Socialists are faced with the following choice: to abandon the traditional non-monopolistic doctrine, attempt to adapt it to the interests of the monopolies, or to somehow combine these two concepts.

Until recent times Chile's Christian Democratic movement also had no precise plan for adapting its own ideological base to the conditions of the country's development within the framework of state-monopolistic capitalism. As such an attempt we can consider the draft of the "social pact" which was drawn up by the CDP leaders and which provides for the implementation of necessary changes after the departure of the present government. Reflected in this document was a striving to bring certain ideological principles of the Christian Democratic doctrine into line with the requirements of the national economy, while taking into account the interests of the monopolies. It is obvious that use was made here of the historical experience of the European, and, in particular, the Italian Christian Democrats.

The development of Latin American capitalism on the basis of the neo-liberal model cannot become a permanent trend when attention is paid to the weakness of the native monopolies in comparison with the trans-national ones and the possibility of opposing the latter only by relying on state support. Its role in the region will, therefore, inevitably increase. Such a course of events increases the probability of a successful re-evaluation of the points of departure of Christian Democratic reformism in the direction of the social reformism which in Western Europe is represented primarily by the Socialist and Social Democratic Parties. In Latin America, therefore, we must not exclude the possibility of a merger of the traditional national-reformist organizations with certain trends of the Christian Democratic movement. Suffice it to recall, in this connection, the example of Ecuador.

The probability of creating such coalitions is conditioned by the principal function of the Christian Democratic movement--the preservation of capitalist

relations under the conditions of a bourgeois-democratic system of government. In Chile this has not yet been successfully achieved, but in Venezuela in the specific segment of historical development such a position has become possible. Far from the last role has been played here by the international and domestic political situation and, above all, by the red heat of class conflicts.

No matter how paradoxical it may seem at first glance, it was precisely the powerful upsurge of the revolutionary struggle on the continent at the end of the 1950's and the 1960's which, to no small extent, reinforced the reformist model of development in Venezuela; and it was the Christian Socialists and Social Democrats who emerged as its carriers. Because, of course, against the background of the radical changes being promulgated in a number of states on the continent, their reforms seemed moderate. Hence too the corresponding attitude of imperialism, which was striving by any means to hamper the strengthening of the positions of the left-wing forces. At the same time, the left-wing parties within the country itself could not put up a revolutionary alternative to the reformist model because of their weakness and fractionation, which were the results of partisan actions in the early 1960's. But in Chile during the second half of the 1960's the left-wing parties advocated the deepening of the anti-militarist and democratic changes being promulgated by the Christian Democratic government of E. Frei more actively and organizationally. This circumstance, along with the mobilization of the masses by the left-wing forces, led for a certain period to a situation whereby within the framework of the CPD there was a predominance of the second trend of Christian Democratic reformism.

On the continental level it was an expression of petit bourgeois Utopian thought, exerting an influence on working people primarily not belonging to the proletarian strata of the population. Its influence became possible inasmuch as during the process of the historically delayed development of capitalism in Latin America significant vestiges of pre-capitalist relations have been preserved. The small-scale producer, who is opposed to the capitalist method of production threatening him with ruination, inevitably projects into the future the outmoded forms of socio-economic development. Hence also the Utopian quality of the idea of the "third path" of Christian socialism, based on the concept of a "communitarian society."

As state-monopolistic relations developed in certain countries of the continent, this trend lost its dynamic role. To a considerable degree such a situation made it necessary for the Christian Democratic movement to re-examine its own basic ideological positions. It is an extremely important fact that the representatives of this petit bourgeois trend under the conditions of the deepening revolutionary process and the necessity of solving the question of power have always striven to overcome the narrowness of the reformist views and go over to the side of the revolutionary democratic forces. Here, however, there has been a constant opposition between tendencies to return to the past and a break-through to the future. The possibility is not excluded that, if there were to be an acute exacerbation of social conflicts, this trend, by rejecting the derived Christian Democratic reformism, would prove capable to making the transition to the camp of the revolutionary forces and be included in the struggle for radical, anti-monopolistic, anti-imperialistic, and democratic changes.

Thus, for example, at the stage of the deepening revolutionary process in Central America many Christian Democrats are taking part in mobilizing, organizing, and directing the masses into the struggle in all its forms. It is a well-known fact that, after the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the Popular Social Christian Party, having acknowledged the leadership role played by the SFNC in reconstructing the country and deepening the revolutionary process, have actively cooperated with the government. Although such a process is not free from contradictions, it does testify to the completely new possibilities for developing progressive trends within the framework of the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America.

This circumstance, as well as the fact that in the countries where the Christian Democrats have already been in power and have succeeded in partially carrying out the second important function of bourgeois reformism, i.e.--to modernize the capitalist system, do not allow us to agree with Ye. A. Kosarev's opinion about the loss of the masses' trust in the CDP. In advancing such a thesis, it is necessary, to a lesser degree, to take into account the concrete historical situation within certain states of the region as well as various strata of the population.

If we examine the problem as applied to those countries where the role of the Christian Democratic movement was quite large during previous years, then it becomes clear that it continues to remain substantial even now. In Chile it is indisputedly true that the CDP is the largest opposition force. Despite the defeat in the 1982 elections in Costa Rica, the Christian Democrats have continued to exert a significant influence on the course of that country's political life. As is known, in the municipal elections held in Venezuela in 1979 more than 50 percent of the votes were cast for the COPEI. Even in El Salvador, despite the completely discredited line of the puppet government of Napoleon Duarte and the pressure exerted on the population by the extreme right-wing forces, during the course of the 1982 elections the CDP received about 40 percent of the votes. In Panama and Peru, in the elections which were held there in 1980, 20 and 12 percent respectively of the voters cast their ballots for the candidates of the Christian Democratic parties. In the Ecuadoran elections of 1980 the Christian Democrats, who were running jointly with the followers of the former president, Roldos, received about 20 percent of the votes.

Thus, if we do pose the question of the loss of trust among the broad strata of the population in the Christian Democratic movement, then this is only relative and at each segment of the historical development of the individual countries. Moreover, it is likewise necessary to take into consideration such factors as the role played by the Catholic Church, which was spoken about, in particular, by A. F. Shul'govskiy and S. I. Semenov, and the bourgeois-democratic potential of the CDP, which undoubtedly means more to the people than the right-wing authoritarian dictatorships, and this was also emphasized in many of the presentations. Nor must we fail to take into account the international contacts of the CDP.

Here I would like to dwell in more detail on the characteristics of the ties between the Christian Democratic movement of Western Europe and that of Latin America. In contrast to the thesis set forth by V. V. Razuvayev concerning

the presence, above all, of certain specific interests of the Western European CDP's in their relations with the Latin American ones, it must be noted that the principal and determining factor conditioning the communality of their activities on a world scale after World War II is the striving to preserve and modernize the capitalist system. An expression of the unity of their views was the creation of the International League of Christian Democrats at the Third Conference of representatives of parties belonging to this orientation, held in Santiago de Chile in 1961.

It is difficult to agree likewise with V. V. Razuvayev's opinion regarding the degree of influence on the Christian Democrats of Latin America of their West German and Italian counterparts. It does not seem justifiable to take as the sole criterion for such an influence merely the interests of the monopolistic capital of both countries, although this, of course, is a factor of considerable importance.

After the replacement of the Social Democratic government of the FRG by the Christian Democratic one, certain changes occurred in the field of that country's domestic policy. Also in the foreign-policy sphere it came as no surprise that the new government's course remained as it was formulated by the FRG's Christian Democrats during the second half of the 1970's. Suffice it to recall merely such a manifestation of this as the active support on the part of the CDS/CSS government of Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador. This line diverged significantly from the course of the Social Democrats, who had even withdrawn their own ambassador from San Salvador as a sign of protest against the policy of the reactionary junta. It is obvious that, at the present time, this coalition has much broader possibilities for implementing the course developed by it as far back as the second half of the 1970's, as compared with that period when the CDS/CSS was in opposition.

Its basic trend was never better reflected than in the words of the prominent ideologist of the CDS/CSS and member of parliament, Tedenhoffer, who declared, in particular, that the policy of the FRG with respect to the developing countries should serve to strengthen its own security, along with the opportunity to be flexible in the world arena. The tendency of support, rendered by the new government of the FRG to these states, is also fully evident: in the first place, it is to be granted to those strata of the Latin American bourgeoisie which are most closely allied with the most reactionary circles of West German finance capital.

In expressing their interests, the members of the CDS/CSS are advocating relations with the developing countries on the basis of the so-called "international social market economics." By this is understood the development of economic ties primarily between the West German and Latin American monopolies. In fact, such an approach to the problem is nothing else but a new form of imperialist dependency at the stage of strengthening monopolistic capitalism in Latin America.

It is possible that the interests of the Italian monopolies with regard to Latin America are not so clearly expressed as is the case with West German big capital. This in no way means, however, that the Italian Christian Democrats are less interested in developing ties with the Christian Democrats of Latin

America. Suffice it to recall the traditional and firm contacts between them which were established as far back as the 1930's, when the founder of the Italian DC, Luigi Sturzo, exerted a direct influence on the formation of the views of such very important figures in the Latin American scene, Christian movement as E. Frei, R. Kalder, and others. It was precisely this distance, as well as the concepts of social development of the Italian Christian Democrats during the post-war years, which played a decisive role in determining the political course of the continent's Christian Socialists, inasmuch as they corresponded to the reality of the Latin American states to a greater degree than the analogous theories of the FRG's Christian Democrats.

It is evident that the condemnation of Napoleon Duarte by the Italian DC, as well as its support of the emigrants belonging to the progressive wing of the CDF of Chile, distinguishes its position from the line of the CDS/CSG. The traditions of the Italian Christian Democratic movement, which took part in the anti-fascist struggle against the Mussolini government, along with other relations with the Communists, Socialists, and Social Democrats, make its tactic of defending the bulwarks of bourgeois "representative democracy" more flexible. Such a position has also determined the ties with Latin America, where their main goal is the unification of all the trends of the Christian Democratic movement, based on the defense and preservation of capitalism.

As regards the West German Christian Democrats, in view of their closer ties with the reactionary circles of big finance capital, they cannot use such a flexible line in their relations with the region's countries. Thus, in comparing the ties of the Italian and West German Christian Democrats with the Latin American ones, it becomes evident that the interests of the former are determined primarily by factors of a political nature, whereas those of the latter --by those of an economic nature. This differentiates the approach of the Italian DC and the CDS/CSG of West Germany both to the global problems of the Christian Democratic movement as well as to their course with respect to Latin America.

Ye. I. Yaropolov (Institute of Economics and International Relations): "The Christian Democrats and the Communists"

The historical and political experience of the development of the Latin American countries is more and more often becoming an object of interested analysis by various political forces in Western Europe. The following is a characteristic example: the events in Chile directly influenced the positions of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and its relations with the Christian Democrats. Furthermore, quite a close, albeit not a direct, connection is to be traced between the events in Chile and the political situation which took shape in Italy during the second half of the 1970's. The principal factor was the complex of problems connected with the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC). As is known, it arose earlier than the corresponding Latin American parties--during the heat of World War II. Later the Italian DC actively facilitated the creation and emergence of the Christian Democratic organizations in other countries, including those in Latin America. By the mid-1970's in Italy the question of the necessity for a dialogue between the Communists and the Catholics on all levels had become an acute one. The PCI made statements about this more and more frequently. An extremely important role was played by the

events in Chile. "We have never made a 'model' out of Chile," wrote Giuliano Faletta, one of the leaders of the PCI, "but this country has provided us with an example, important not only during the days of the victories gained by the Popular Unity but also during the tragic period of defeat." What impelled them to analyze the Chilean events was the presence of a significant number of common traits in the socio-political development of the two countries: the large role played by the Communist and Socialist Parties, the influence of the working class, the importance of a dialogue with the Christian Democrats, the permanent presence of the neo-fascist danger, etc.

The events in Chile provided a unique kind of impetus to the PCI's development of a strategy of "historical compromise." "We have always considered," wrote the PCI's general secretary, E. Berlinguer, "--and even now the Chilean experience strengthens us in this opinion--that the unity of the parties of the working people and the left-wing forces is not a sufficient condition for guaranteeing the protection and reinforcing democracy, if this unity is opposed by a bloc of parties encompassing forces to the right of center. The main political problem in Italy...is precisely the task of not allowing the creation of a stable and organic combination of the center and the right-wing, a broad front of the clerical-fascistic type. It is necessary, in contrast, to attempt to shift the social and political forces which are in the center to consistently democratic positions." Herein lies the essence of the strategy of "historical compromise"; to avoid the "vertical" splitting of the country, which could lead to events of the Chilean type.

Thus, implementation of the line aimed at a "historical compromise" presupposes support on the part of the broadest strata of the population (primarily, of the middle classes) and the coordinated actions of various political forces, mass movements, and the three most important parties, the Communist, Christian Democrat, and Socialist Parties. Such a line was, however, directed, in the first place, at achieving mutual understanding with the Catholic masses and their political organization--the DC.

After the parliamentary elections of 1974, at which more votes were cast for the PCI than before, there appeared in the country the possibility of a specific implementation of a policy of national unity and the promulgation of progressive measures. As a result of lengthy negotiations and a number of agreements, March 1978 saw the creation of a one-party government of Christian Democrats, relaying on a parliamentary majority, which for the first time in the last 30 years included Communists, and it was called upon to carry out a program approved by all the participants in the coalition.

It soon became clear, however, that the DC, as the performer of the will of the bourgeoisie, was not interested in carrying out radical changes. Moreover, the right-wing forces within the party strove to discredit the line taken by the deputies from the PCI in order to maintain a parliamentary majority without allowing them into the government. In characterizing the line taken by the DC, E. Berlinguer emphasized that it was "two-faced, contradictory, and turned toward the past rather than toward the future." Since it no longer considered it possible to support a government which was ignoring the interests of the working people and was not observing agreements reached previously, the PCI again went into opposition in January 1979.

By maintaining its "monopoly of power" for a long time and by utilizing its privileged position as the ruling party, the DC was able to create around itself an entire network of organizations through which it has exerted an influence on various aspects of the life of working people. It was able to subordinate to its own control many state and semi-state institutes and institutions by essentially encouraging corruption and a trade in "cushy jobs." The "clients" who were favored in such a way rendered all kinds of support to their "patron." Thus was created a vicious circle from which the DC is, in fact, no longer able to extricate itself.

Nevertheless, the experience of the PCI and the DC cooperating on the state level--this "historical experiment"--posed a whole range of questions, the main one of which is as follows: is it possible, in general, to have fruitful cooperation between Christian Democrats and Communists? There can be no simple answer to this question. In the present-day situation, when the leaders of the DC have steered their party to the right, when their attempt to make Italy the "best ally" of the United States can be traced more and more clearly, such cooperation is certainly impossible. It should also be taken into account that, after the tragic death of A. Moro in 1978, the left-wing trend in the party fell apart and became quite weak; this led to a situation whereby the "pendulum" of the DC has swung even more to the right.

At the same time big monopolistic capital has continued to regard the Christian Democratic movement as its own main political bulwark in the country. Therefore, extraordinary efforts have been undertaken in order to suppress or in some way to turn to the advantage of the monopolies all the democratic, progressive tendencies which have manifested themselves within the party. A direct response to the turn to the right by the DC was the unprecedented draining away of voters from this party in the 1983 parliamentary elections, when the Christian Democrats lost more than 5 percent of the votes.

S. M. Usmanov (Latin American Institute): "What the Chilean Experience Has Confirmed"

Certain discussants, in particular, K. L. Maydanik and V. P. Totskiy, have noted that the Christian Democratic movement at the present time is, to an increasingly greater degree, moving away from the positions of bourgeois reformism and is approaching a more adequate expression of the interests of those strata which are connected to the trans-national corporations (TNC). In our opinion, the experience of the Chilean reality does not provide the grounds for such conclusions.

In the first place, for the Christian Democratic movement of Chile, as well as for the other relatively developed countries of Latin America, the alternative can hardly be posed merely as follows: either a bloc with the TNC or a loss of the opportunity to come to power as the inheritors of the military-technocratic regimes. In this sense, it is also difficult to agree with the opinion of Ye. A. Kosarev, who evaluates the political prospects of the Chilean CDP very pessimistically. The history of other states on this continent --Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador--have demonstrated the possibility of implementing the reformist plans of the Christian Democratic movement both independently as well as in league with other political forces.

In Chile too the "social pact" between the government, working people, and the entrepreneurs, as put forth by the leadership of the Christian Democrats for the post-dictatorship period, presupposes conditions for the activities of the TNC which are less advantageous in comparison with the present ones. Of course, there is a considerable distance between the declarations and the specific actions of the leaders. Considerably more important, however, is the fact that it is scarcely the Christian Democratic movement but rather the present-day dictatorial regime which is the principal expression of the interests of the social strata connected with the TNC.

In the second place, within the Chilean Christian Democratic Movement there exist influential groups which retain an anti-dictatorial, anti-imperialist, and even an anti-monopolistic potential. This is testified to, in particular, by the activity of "Group 24," more precisely by certain aspects of its program, as thoroughly analyzed by N. S. Monovalova. This can be judged to a still greater degree by the work of the Chilean CDP in the trade-union movement, in particular, in the National Coordinating Center of Trade Unions and the Conference of Workers in the Copper-Mining Industry. Nor should we forget the fact that the foundation of the social basis of the CDP has always been composed of the middle strata and certain categories of the working class and peasantry. Under the conditions of the existence of the anti-popular "model" the pressure of the radicalizing masses on the party leadership via the reorganized trade-union movement, the progressive circles of the Catholic Church, the Christian base societies, the university youth, and many public organizations constitutes, in our opinion, one of the key factors determining the further evolution of Chile's Christian Democratic movement. This is particularly important if we bear in mind the "generational change" in the leadership of the CDP after the death in 1982 of its leader, Eduardo Frei.

Another essential question which was raised in the discussion is the following: how ready are the Christian Democrats to take power under the present-day conditions? Here, in our opinion, one can agree with the thesis of Ye. A. Kosarev concerning a definite weakness of the economic program of the Chilean CDP. Indeed, the promulgation by the Pinochet dictatorship of the "modernization" in accordance with the prescriptions of the "Chicago School" has temporarily thrown the Christian Democrats to the sidelines of Latin American bourgeois socio-economic thought and left it, to a large extent, unprepared for such a course of events. Nor was it by chance that a number of highly paid specialists, who, directly or indirectly, represented the interests of the big monopolistic bourgeoisie within the CDP, after the coup of 11 September 1973, went over--permanently or temporarily--to service under the dictator.

Nevertheless, the Christian Democrats have at their disposal sufficient means to develop an alternative model of economic development or to adapt growingly obsolete ideas to the demands of the times. The leaders of the CDP have also actively studied the Western European experience. In particular, the works and speeches of E. Frei, A. Saldivar, and other leaders of the party have examined, as applicable to Chile, the "Fact of Moncloa" in Spain, the "social contract" in Great Britain, certain political solutions of the Italian Christian Democratic movement, etc. Furthermore, the high social price of the existing model and growth of the labor movement during the last few years have made the regime's socio-economic policy more and more unattractive among even the comparatively weakly politicized strata of the population.

Under these conditions the politico-juridical mechanisms of power, as worked out by "Group 24," and which were mentioned by N. S. Konovalova, could become extremely timely. As regards the strictly economic portion of the program, the Neo-Keynesian methods of state regulation of the economy, as adjusted in the spirit of institutionalism, in combination with certain of the socio-economic demands formulated by the National Coordinating Center of the Trade Unions in the "National List of Demands," could fully impart a definite dynamism to the rather diffuse socio-economic plan of the Christian Democrats.

Likewise extremely timely for the Chilean CDP is the question of the Christian base societies, which, as vividly expressed by A. F. Shul'govskiy, have become a unique kind of "bridge," connecting the Christian Democratic movement, the Church, and the rank-and-file believers. It is important to note that the party leaders do not simply regard the activists of these societies as their own "reserves." Thus, E. Frei noted that the CDP ought to impart a "political expression corresponding to Christian principles," to the awareness of that portion of the youth which functions in church circles in order to be ready for the beginning of democratic changes.

While dwelling on the problem of mutual relations between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, I would like to note that the approach formulated by E. S. Dabagyan of "cooperation--competition," wherein the former element is more essential, is, in our view, confirmed by the development of events in Chile. For a number of years now some of the leaders of the CDP have been expressing themselves as to the desirability of joint actions with the forces of the Social Democratic persuasion. And in March 1983, under the conditions of a growing opposition struggle against the dictatorship, the Christian Democrats, together with the representatives of a number of right-wing, centrists, and even left-wing organizations published a plan for the creation of a "Multipartidarity" (by analogy with the Argentinian one), and they signed a manifesto with a demand for the restoration of democracy.

Thus, the Chilean Christian Democratic movement has a future; it can play a significant role in the struggle for a social, political, and cultural renewal of society. And, no matter how paradoxical it may seem at first glance, this role can be all the more positive, the stronger, better organized, and more solid the left-wing forces become.

A. A. Istomin (Latin American Institute): "On the Question of Ecuador's Christian Democratic Movement"

In the discussion about the Christian Democratic movement among the new phenomena in the development of this ideological-political trend S. I. Semenov cited the nationalistic, populist movements of Christian Democratic orientation. In connection with this, mention was made of Ecuador's Christian Democratic movement, which, unfortunately, has not become an object of detailed examination. It seems necessary to partially fill in this gap, all the more so in that the socio-political problems of Ecuador are among the least developed in Soviet Latin American studies.

As a bourgeois-reformist trend, the Christian Democratic movement took shape in Ecuador during the first half of the 1960's--amid circumstances of a socio-political crisis, exacerbation of class conflicts, and quests for a reformist

alternative to the revolutionary process. In 1964 young members of the Catholic intelligentsia and Christian syndicalism founded a Christian Democratic Party.

The Ecuadoran Christian Democrats were critical of capitalism and oligarchy, and they set forth the slogan of "communitarian socialism," the socio-economic aspect of which was understood to be the co-existence of "communitarian," state, and private property ownership. At first the new party did not enjoy a widespread influence. Ecuador's socio-economic backwardness, the delayed and deformed maturation of the structures of bourgeois society, the presence of a broad stratum of marginal population, the caudillist traditions of political culture, the weakness of the system of political parties as a means for socially integrating the masses--all this hampered the growth of the CDP's influence and, at the same time, conditioned the significant role of populist movements in the political life of the country.

After the military came to power in 1972, the country was turned into an exporter of petroleum. The nationalistic course of the new government facilitated the strengthening of the positions of the state sector. During the ensuing period--at the stage of the transition from a military regime to a civilian one (1976--1979)--there occurred an activation of the reformist forces, which were striving for a socio-political stabilization based on creating stable structures of a "representative democracy" and the promulgation of a reformist course relying on the state sector and on oil revenues. The principal element of the political system was to have become mass political parties.

Under the new conditions the Christian Democratic movement turned out to be one of the important components of the political structure. It took an active part in the process of the "juridical re-structuring of the state," which was accompanied by a modernization of the country's political system. The line of the CDP and the other reformist forces was reflected in the basic documents which were supposed to define the principal traits of this system after the departure of the military. In particular, this was manifested in the 1978 constitution, which juridically strengthened the multi-sectorial nature of the economy, and in the legislation on parties and elections, as worked out by a commission chaired by the leader of the CDP, O. Hurtado. This legislation was aimed at creating the conditions for the formation of mass bourgeois parties, based on ideological rather than personalistic principles.

The second half of the 1970's witnessed the culmination of the process of demarcation between the reactionary and reformist trends among the forces of the Catholic orientation. In 1977 the Conservative Party was abandoned by its left wing--the so-called "progressive conservatives," headed by the former party leader, J. S. Trujillo. In February 1978, as a result of the merger of the CDP and the "progressive conservatives," a party was founded entitled the Popular Democracy--Christian Democratic Union (DP--UDC).

During the course of the discussion S. I. Semenov noted that the movement organized by Hurtado, "though it was not superficially Christian Democratic, was founded on a traditional populism of a nationalistic nature." If we are talking about the DP--UDC in this case, then it is impossible to agree with such an opinion. This organization constitutes a Christian Democratic party which

is distinguished from populist movements by its ideology ("communitarian socialism" as an alternative to capitalism) as well as by its orientation to another type of political culture, by the absence of caudillism. Nevertheless, at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's there took place within Ecuador's political life a unique "symbiosis" of the Christian Democratic movement and the "classical" populism, thanks to which the former was able to come to power.

Under the conditions of the extreme fractionation of political forces which is characteristic of this country, Hurtado at the beginning of the 1978 election campaign advocated the creation of a broad "left-centrist" bloc of reformist movements, called upon to isolate both the right-wing and the left-wing organizations. However, because of rivalry among the reformist factions, such a front was not formed. They only succeeded in creating a coalition including the DP--UDC and the populist movement entitled the Combination of Popular Forces (CFP). Refusal to recognize the DP--UDC by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal compelled Hurtado to carry out a rapid maneuver: the candidates of the Christian Democrats formally joined the CFP and were put forth on its lists. The candidates for the posts of president and vice-president were, respectively, the representative of the CFP, J. Roldos and O. Hurtado.

The political "symbiosis" between the DP--UDC and the CFP, which bore, on the whole, a populist coloration, was an extremely important prerequisite for their victory in the 1979 elections. A common anti-oligarchical, reformist tendency drew these parties closer together and ensured them of popularity among the broad masses, who were anticipating changes. At the same time, the diversity of the forces which had entered into such an alliance allowed them to attract to their side various social strata, combining the influence of both parties in geographical, social, and organizational aspects. Alliance with the CFP, which enjoyed the support of the marginal strata, ensured the Christian Democrats of a broad, mass base. The CFP, as an influential force in the coastal region--the Costa--and particularly in Guayaquil, by means of its bloc with the DP--UDC, obtained "access" to the Sierra, where the positions of the latter were stronger, as well as the necessary respectability in the eyes of the middle strata. The programmatic precision of the reformism of the Christian Democrats during the course of the election campaign was combined with the populist rhetoric of the CFP and its experience in mobilizing the electorate. Also of definite importance were the international ties of the Christian Democratic movement.

The Roldos-Hurtado program was designed for a broad poly-class base, and this imparted a populist nature to the coalition. The alliance between the Christian Democratic movement and populism also continued after the victory in the presidential elections. After a split in the CFP, Roldos's faction, entitled "People, Changes, and Democracy," emerged as the partner of the Christian Democrats. With its support, the DP--UDC received about 20 percent of the votes and took second place in the elections to the local organs of power which were held in December 1980.

However, inasmuch as for the Christian Democrats as well as for their partners, the joining together in a coalition was a tactical maneuver, determined by political conditions, the lack of stability and durability of this alliance soon

evident. After the death of President Roldos in 1981 and the appointment of O. Hurtado as head of state, the alliance fell apart. The basic task--victory in the elections--had been achieved in 1979. Having had recourse at a certain period to "populistic" mimicry, the Christian Democratic movement now strove to maintain its own political individuality.

The position of the Christian Democrats in power at the present time is quite a complex one. They do not have a majority in the congress. The country is undergoing an economic crisis; the promulgation of a reformist course by the government has encountered difficulties. Social tension has grown. The Hurtado government is opposed by the United Front of Workers, which includes the three leading trade-union central organizations. During the last three years the country has had five general strikes. At the same time, without having been able to ensure social stability, the DP--UDC has, evidently, lost the confidence of the ruling classes to a significant extent.

A party of Social Democratic orientation--the Democratic Left--enjoys a successful rivalry with the DP--UDC. The Democratic Left has now become one of the foremost reformist parties and has undergone the influence of the populist traditions to a greater degree, perhaps, than the DP--UDC. The retention of populist traditions in the contemporary political life of Ecuador may be explained to a large extent by the immaturity and deformed nature of the country's social structure, which finds expression in the poly-class quality of the mass base of the reformist movements which have emerged in recent decades.

Inasmuch as in the elections of recent years the People's Democratic movement has not run independently but rather in a coalition, the genuine degree of its influence at the present time is not sufficiently clear. The results of the 1984 presidential and parliamentary elections will allow us to specify more precisely the deployment of the political forces and the trends for the country's further development, including the prospects for the Christian Democratic movement in Ecuador.

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INTERNATIONAL

EXPERIENCE OF GRENADIAN REVOLUTION, U.S. INTERVENTION SURVEYED

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[Commentary by V. N. Lunin, special correspondent: "Grenada: The Logic of Imperial Force"]

[Text] At the very beginning of October 1983, just a few days prior to those fateful events on Grenada which led to the demise of the revolution, I, as the correspondent of the journal LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, accredited in Havana, had an opportunity to visit this small, island country. In the space of three hours it can be traversed along a picturesque road, which first rises up the slopes of low-lying hills, covered with ever-green, tropical vegetation, and then descends into no less attractive valleys. The road, which at times goes right down to the shore itself, and sometimes goes somewhat inland away from it, makes unimaginable zig-zags and sharp curves, where it is sometimes difficult for two motor vehicles traveling in opposite directions to pass each other....

One could hardly have supposed then that the Grenadian revolution would likewise be about to make an unimaginable political zig-zag, one which would be immediately taken advantage of by Reagan, who, with the impatience of a militant fanatic, has sought out an excuse to make the transition from militaristic speeches to gendarme-like deeds and who has been dreaming, ever since the Malvinian events, of grasping the palm of primacy as an "unbending leader" from the "iron" Mrs. Thatcher.

Once having visited Grenada, you would immediately become convinced that only mentally ill persons could believe in the inventions of the American President to the effect that this "tiny" state could be a threat to the "security of the United States." The mythical military threat of Grenada to its neighbors has now become, after the island's occupation by American troops, as visible as a Sword of Damocles hanging over all the states of the Caribbean Basin. In particular, the civil airport on Grenada has now, indeed, been converted into a new U.S. military base, while the entire "spice island," as Grenada has been designated in the tourist brochures, has been turned into a "special island" of the Pentagon.

It would be easy to convince anyone during the very first moments of his acquaintanceship with the country of the fact that the revolutionary process which developed in this country has been concentrated on solving those acute internal problems which were inherited from the times of the dictatorship of

the "father of the nation," Gairy. Also obvious is the entire absurdity of the imaginings of Washington's Caribbean satellites concerning the supposed "Grenadian menace" hanging over them. For them the real menace consisted, of course, not in the military threat on the part of Grenada's government but rather in the magnetic force of a revolutionary break-through, capable of inspiring the peoples of the region's other states. And this magnetic force did not disappear with the demise of the Grenadian Revolution; it will remain--and not only in the memory of the Grenadians....

By a Constructive Step

When Bishop came to power, the Grenadian revolutionaries set forth a program of changes designed to rally the widest strata of the people around the New Jewel Movement and lead the masses to a recognition of the need to deepen the revolution as it was being developed. The principles and goals of the New Jewel Movement were formulated in the manifesto (fundamental program) entitled "For the Power of the People and True Independence" (1973) and the "Declaration of Principles" (1974). The manifesto, which comprised 33 points, contained an analysis of the country's most acute problems; it affirmed the people's right to overthrow the Gairy dictatorship, which had thrown the country into chaos (it was not by chance that the 25-year reign of this dictator received in Grenada the eloquent definition of "the Gairy Hurricane"); and it assigned the task of constructing a new society. The "Declaration of Principles" proclaimed 10 goals as follows: the active participation of the people in the life of society; a people's democracy; cooperatives in the people's interests; a universal system of health care; a flourishing of the people's talents, capabilities, and culture; people's monitoring controls on the national economy; a standard of living sufficient for every family; freedom of religious belief; a unified people--a new and just society.

It is characteristic that these documents reflected the readiness of the New Jewel Movement to raise the entire people to the struggle. Bishop's governmental policy was based on the striving to re-structure the economy on the path of democratizing society. In all spheres of public life after the fall of the tyranny, the revolutionary government began to carry out specific measures designed to change the domestic and foreign aspect of the Grenadian state, to put an end to the dependent nature of its economic development, the backwardness of its agricultural production, and the factual absence of industry, as well as the illiteracy of the population and mass unemployment. The country was similar to a construction project where the foundations for the future were being laid.

Likewise testifying to the innovative quality of the revolutionary policy of Bishop's government is the fact that he, while functioning amid circumstances of a generally extremely hostile attitude on the part of most of the neighboring states, succeeded in establishing a *modus vivendi* with both native and foreign capital, which began to engage in business partnership with the new regime. The use of this model for the development of a small country with an open economy proved to be successful. Over the extent of the entire four and a half years of the revolution the gross domestic product (GDP) increased steadily. In 1979 its growth amounted to 2.1 percent, in 1980--3.0 percent, in 1981--3.0 percent, and in 1982--5.5 percent. In 1983 also an increase in the GDP was anticipated.

It is noteworthy that all these successes were achieved under conditions of the continuing crisis upheavals of the world capitalist economy, the decline of world prices on nutmegs, bananas, and cacao, which provided the country with 97 percent of all export revenues. Moreover, during the first few years of the revolution substantial economic damage was inflicted on Grenada by natural disasters--hurricanes and tropical rainstorms--which have sometimes brought economic life in the island states of the Caribbean Basin to the brink of catastrophe (in particular, in 1980 some 27 percent of the nutmeg crop perished, as well as 40 percent of the bananas, and 19 percent of the cacao).

The long-term economic strategy of the people's government was based on implementing the principle of a mixed, tri-sectorial economy: state, cooperative, and private--native and foreign--sectors. The leading role was relegated to the state system. "Taking into account the extremely low level of technology, the limited human resources, shortage of capital investments, and insufficient experience in the sphere of marketing," M. Bishop noted, "it is impossible to lift the economy up by relying solely on the efforts of the state sector. Consequently, we must also stimulate the private sector in the economy as a whole and in agriculture in particular, according particular attention herein to the small-scale and medium-scale farmers."

In contrast to the Gairy regime, which became mired in arbitrary rule and corruption, from which, by the way, private business also suffered, the Bishop government ensured the conditions for the normal functioning of private capital. Herein, of course, it was far from allowing free rein to the completely spontaneous activity of private entrepreneurs. At the beginning of 1983 a Grenadian investment code was adopted, in accordance with which a legislative procedure was affirmed for the principle of a mixed economy, and recognition was given, on the basis of profitability criteria, to the role of private investments in achieving the economic, financial, and social goals of the governmental policy. This code provided for measures to encourage native and foreign private investments, giving preferential treatment to long-term investments in industry and in the tourist "industry." At the same time a number of limitations and prohibitions were introduced on the activity of private (especially foreign) capital. Spheres were specified where limitations were placed on the further expansion of the activity of private enterprise--the banking and insurance business, foreign trade operations and wholesale trade, fishing and transport. The government reserved for itself the right to establish in the future controls over communal farming, informational media, the infra-structure, domestic airlines, telecommunications, and trade in certain items.

In accordance with the new economic model which was adopted in Grenada, particular attention was likewise accorded to the creation of a strong state sector. The state enterprises were supposed to become profitable and capable of competing (for example, with regard to labor productivity and production costs) with the private sector, and, in time, even to crowd it out of certain spheres of the economy. In order to achieve these goals, the state capital investments in 1979 amounted to 16 million dollars, in 1980--to 35 million, in 1981--to 19 million, and in 1982--to 101 million, which significantly exceeded the capital investments for the entire 25 years of Gairy's rule.

Indisputable proof of the successes of the economic policy conducted by the Bishop government was the fact that for revolutionary Grenada the problem of foreign indebtedness did not become acute. Moreover, the country's outlays for payments on its foreign indebtedness were among the lowest in the world, amounting to 3 percent of the GDP in 1982 and 3.7 percent of the currency revenues of Grenada.

During the years of the people's regime measures were also undertaken to introduce new methods for administering state enterprises. For the first time in the country's history plan indicators and assignments began to be utilized. The first one-year plans were successfully carried out. Based on this, they proceeded to work out medium-range development plans in the country. In order to increase the effectiveness of planning, new state organs were instituted; they were supposed to regulate the system of prices, distribution, administration, controls, etc. Within the framework of the planned economy a considerable number of diverse facilities and enterprises were built, most of which were not large but did have primary importance for Grenada's development. If prior to 1979 the state sector was represented by merely a small number of state farms existing on government subsidies, after the revolution it underwent substantial changes. The state expanded the sectorial range of its own activity. At first agro-industrial enterprises were created. Then systems of energy supply and telephone service were put into operation, along with fishing boats, two banks, a number of hotels, a motor-bus pool, etc. An entire network of specialized companies and commissions was formed to effectively administer the enterprises of the state sector.

The government accorded a great deal of attention to expanding the infrastructure. Among the new construction projects important for the country we ought to single out the Sandino Home-Building Combine, an enterprise for producing asphalt, and others. As a result, in 1982 the increase in the state sector's gross domestic product amounted to 34 percent, and it significantly lifted up the country's industrial potential.

The cooperative sector in the economy was created after the revolution. It began to play a noticeable role in agriculture. The efforts of the Bishop government in this sphere were directed at expanding the export products list by means of an increase in labor productivity, introducing agro-engineering methods, and by means of attracting youths to the cooperatives (prior to the revolution the average farmer's age amounted to 62 years).

Carrying out the re-structuring of the national economy was not an easy matter. The enterprises being created in the state and cooperative sectors experienced acute shortages of skilled manpower, management personnel, and there was insufficient organizational experience. In order to overcome the difficulties connected with the backwardness of Grenada's development, the revolutionary authorities promulgated a number of such specific measures as creating courses to upgrade qualifications, vocational schools with accelerated training cycles, and a network of general-educational instruction.

The economic model which was put into practice in revolutionary Grenada immediately opened up broad social prospects. Thus, on the eve of the revolution unemployment encompassed 49 percent of the independently acting population

(moreover, among women it had reached 69 percent, and among youths under 25 years of age--80 percent), while three years later--this figure was only 14 percent. In 1983 hundreds more new jobs were created. A fully realizable task was assigned--to eradicate unemployment by 1985.

The Bishop government connected great hopes with the implementation of an old dream of the Grenadians--the construction of an up-to-date airport which could accommodate large, passenger airliners. It was anticipated that the number of tourists arriving on the island would increase substantially, and the country's income from foreign tourism would increase three-fold. In accordance with the concept of the "new tourism," a prospective scheme was likewise worked out for developing the island's natural resources. Moreover, the Bishop government strove to retain the island's natural beauty and not build high-rise hotels, which would have deprived this pearl of the Eastern Caribbean Sea of its enchanting attractiveness. It is characteristic that all the hotels on Grenada are of the cottage type, while the residential and public buildings do not go above two or three storeys. This imparts an original and unique color to the island. The Grenadians have carefully guarded their nature from "reinforced-concrete progress."

That is why the new airport, the construction site of which I had occasion to visit, did not destroy the natural harmony; it was not like the Western European or North American "air portals." Not far from the runway, which is 9,000 feet long (by the way, this is not the longest runway even by Eastern Caribbean standards), which runs along only a few meters from the sea waves, there is a row of low-lying structures constituting the air terminal, and the hills rise behind them. But that was before the intervention....

...Less than five months remained to the fifth anniversary of the revolutionary coup of 13 March 1979--a "victorious Moncada" (to use Fidel Castro's expression), an event which brought about a major change in the features of Grenada, a small island-state which had previously been little known. The non-numerous but freedom-loving people prepared itself to celebrate this anniversary, which was also associated with the official opening of the international airport at Point Salines, the construction of which, thanks to the participation of a number of countries, was approaching completion. In noting the particular significance for Grenada's future of putting this very important facility into operation, Bishop emphasized that the island's history would be divided into two periods--the "pre-airport" and the "post-airport."

However, it was not only the Grenadian people who linked their hopes with the new airport; the course of its construction was also attentively observed by Washington, which had recourse to all manner of devices to slow it down, to present the construction of the airport as an immediate "very dreadful" threat to the security of the United States as well as to Grenada's Eastern Caribbean neighbors, as a new "military staging area" for conducting subversive activity in the region.

Washington's true interests are testified to extremely eloquently by the fact that the U.S. government, as Bishop declared as far back as 1977, proposed to the Grenadian authorities that it would render the necessary financial aid through the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] for the

construction of a contemporary airport in exchange for its use over the course of 99 years. After the revolution the attitude of the United States toward this project became completely different, for, naturally, there could no longer be any talk of any concession, and, when in September 1979 the Grenadan government requested the United States, as well as a number of European, Arab, and Caribbean countries to render aid in carrying out this project, Washington not only refused but also applied quite a bit of pressure to make sure that its Western European allies followed its own example. Despite this pressure, however, Grenada did obtain financial and technical assistance not only from the Island of Freedom but also from several Western European states. This fact alone is sufficient to reveal the absurdity of Reagan's assertions about the "military purpose" of the airport.

A New Foreign Policy Course

The peace-loving quality of the renovated Grenada found its fullest manifestation in the country's foreign policy. The Bishop government broke decisively away from the Gairy international course, which had blindly followed in the fairway of Washington's strategy and had shown independence only in attempts to draw the international community's attention to the problem of UFO's. After the victory of the revolution the foreign policy of the Grenadian state was "brought down" from outer space and directed at solving day-to-day problems. Grenada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Unison Whiteman, emphasized the following: "We who over the course of many centuries have been pawns on the diplomatic chessboards of the ruthless colonialists are putting forth the legitimate demand that we be granted the chance to develop our societies in the interests of our peoples, without any sort of external interference or dictates. Our peoples do not possess the funds to glorify and romanticize war, nor do we wish to do so."

The formulation of the new foreign policy course to be followed by Grenada was influenced both by the programmatic principles of the New Jewel Movement by the course of the revolution's development. The systems-forming thrust of the Bishop government's foreign policy became the anti-imperialist struggle and the policy of non-alignment; moreover, non-alignment was understood not as a passive self-isolation but as an active advocacy in the defense of the sovereignty, independence, and right of peoples to self-determination, as a means for facilitating the growth of the revolution's international authority.

Proclamation of the new principles was accompanied by their decisive defense in the world arena. As a result, there was a precipitous expansion in the system of Grenada's foreign-policy ties. It became a fully entitled member of the non-alignment movement. The number of countries with which Grenada established diplomatic relations (about 70) almost doubled.

Having shattered the traditional ideas about the genuine possibilities of "tiny" states in international relations, the revolution demonstrated that, not only under the conditions of detente but also in complex international circumstances these countries could advocate independent points of view and put forth constructive initiatives. Let us dwell, in particular, on two extremely important proposals set forth by the Bishop government and having an ongoing significance even after the demise of the revolution.

The first of them was set forth in 1979 at the Ninth General Assembly of the OAS. Its essence boiled down to a proclamation of the Caribbean Basin as a zone of peace, independence, and development. Despite the position taken by the U.S. delegation, the OAS approved this initiative by the Bishop government. Over the extent of all its revolutionary years Grenada at international conferences, at the UN, and in the non-alignment movement defended its proposal, which opened up prospects for eliminating tension in the region and entering it into a new phase of development. It is well known that because of Washington's obstructionist position and its pressure on the small states of the Eastern part of the Caribbean Basin, this peace-loving initiative on the part of Grenada was not successfully implemented. Nevertheless, the Bishop government was not stopped by the difficulties, and it constructively enriched the proposal which it had set forth. "Our position," it declared, "consists in the fact that operational military forces, air-force, and naval patrols ought to be outlawed. We consider that military bases and installations should be removed from the territories of the Latin American and Caribbean countries which do not wish to have them. The peoples of this region ought to be free from military-aggressive blackmail from any military power whatsoever. An end must be put to the Monroe Doctrine and all other doctrines aimed at perpetuating the hegemonism, interventionism, or satellization of the region."

A second initiative was also put forth in 1979. At the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly Bishop proposed the recognition and implementation in international relations of the criterion of "tinyness," characterizing the specific place in the world of certain small states. In addressing the international community, he called for the adoption of a special program of aid to this group of states, which, as no other countries, are dependent on the vagaries of the natural elements, capable of inflicting irreparable damage to their economies. He was talking about rendering rapid first aid, about introducing a so-called operationally effective program for restoring an economy. It was symptomatic that this initiative of Grenada likewise encountered widespread understanding in international public opinion and, of course, found support in those countries where the factor of the natural elements is a genuinely tangible, permanent threat. In particular, the conference of the government heads of the Commonwealth member-countries, situated in the Western Hemisphere, which was held in St. Lucia in February 1983, adopted a communique which noted the necessity for recognizing for the small, island-states a "special procedure pertaining to their specific problems of development."

The departure from the tradition of "alignment with the mother country," the recognition by Grenadians of the communality of their interests with the destiny of mankind, and the demand for the inclusion of the "tiny" countries in world development were not to the liking of official Washington. As a result, two names remain in the memory of Grenadians--two antipodal names--Bishop and Reagan. The former personified a striving towards renovating the world, the latter--towards keeping its status quo by any convenient means.

Towards a New Society

Within the process of the national rebirth the revolutionary government of Grenada, along with re-structuring the economy and the foreign-policy course, accorded particular importance to mobilizing the masses to protect their own gains,

creating a new structure of mass organizations, ensuring the direct participation of the working people in solving the entire complex of nationwide problems. In order to attain these goals, it strove to provide the conditions for developing the creative initiative of the masses, utilizing their revolutionary energy. "What the Grenadian revolution is attempting to accomplish," Bishop noted, "is to complete the transition from formal independence to a people's regime, from the freedom of a small cluster of ruling families who used to run the country's business to the freedom of the entire people to express and carry out their own thoughts and aspirations."

Parallel with great efforts in the fields of health care, education, and social insurance, the Bishop government created the foundations of an original political system, one which would take into account the specifics of the small island-country, experience in organizing the masses, as accumulated by the New Jewel Movement during its years of earlier struggle, along with the revolutionary experience of other countries.

In order to evaluate the creative work of the Grenadian revolution in these fields, it is necessary to begin with how Gairy "ended," i. e., what kind of "political heritage" he left behind. Prior to the victory of the revolution, Grenada's political system was repressive in its nature, for it deprived the masses of the basic political rights and liberties, including the right to work. Working people could not have their own trade unions, and they were denied the right to strike. Opposition activity was harshly persecuted; special groups terrorized the population. Under these conditions the parliament served merely as a screen for legalizing the repressions.

After 13 March 1979 the situation changed radically. The anti-popular laws were abolished, and the working people acquired the right of free association. "Our duty," Bishop emphasized, "is to put the trade-union movement at the center of the process in our country, to create an indissoluble system of ties between the working people, the democratic institutions and structures..." In contrast to the traditional parliamentary system of the "Westminster" type, which had assumed the most ugly forms under the Gairy regime, a system of a genuine people's democracy was formed in Grenada. Moreover, its leading principles became the accountability to the people of all the officials right up to the ministers, the active participation by the people in discussing and adopting solutions of problems of national and local importance.

The entire country was divided into seven parishes (including the parish encompassing the islands of Carriacou and Petit Martinique), and a council was created in each parish. Participating in their work were members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement, members of party-support groups, representatives of mass public organizations, and the managers of those enterprises or departments whose work was under discussion at the sessions concerned. The parishes, in turn, were divided further into several zones, within which zonal councils were made operational. The work of the parish and zonal councils, as well as that of all the mass organizations within the bounds of a parish, were coordinated by a special commission--the Parish Coordinating Bureau.

These organs of the people's democracy were in the process of constantly searching for ways to improve their activities, since the country was experiencing

great difficulties in the sphere of mass information: there was not enough paper to publish two nationwide newspapers; a few months prior to the American aggression the national television ceased to function. In analysing the political system of Grenada, it is necessary to bear in mind that the revolutionary vanguard was operating under conditions whereby most of the country's population was strongly influenced by the Church, which enjoyed a moral authority among the masses thanks to the fact that it had condemned the Gairy regime. Therefore, in developing the system of people's democracy, the Bishop government at the same time regarded the new organs of power as a school for the political training of the masses.

The new government creatively approached the solution of such a typical problem for Caribbean states consisting of two or more islands as the gap in the development between the central island and the smaller ones. Gairy's neglect of the interests of the smaller islands at times was the principle cause of the rise of separatist tendencies among part of the population of Carriacou and Petit Martinique. After the victory of the revolution the Bishop government paid at least as much, if not more, attention to the economic, social, and political problems of these islands as they did to the "main" island. This practice, which was in contrast to Gairy's course, reinforced the unity of the Grenadian state and led to a situation whereby many persons born on these islands but who were living abroad began to return to the motherland.

In 1983 a process began which was supposed to strengthen in a legislative procedure the new political structure which had taken shape. A special commission was set up to work out a new constitution. In touching upon this question, we should note that the commission's task included summarizing and taking into account diverse opinions expressed during the course of the constitution's preparation, as well as studying the experience of other countries in this field. It was proposed that the draft constitution be submitted for broad-based popular discussion so that those wishes, additions, and amendments which would have been expressed could have been taken into the widest possible account. Then a national referendum was to have been held on the question of adopting the new constitution. After it had gone into force, elections were to have been held in the country.

As is known, demagoguery concerning elections is one of the White House's best-liked devices, supposed to show the "anti-constitutionality" of revolutionary forces in power. By the way, if one turns to the history of the United States itself, then we see that, after the bourgeois-democratic revolution which led to the formation of an independent state in 1776, elections were held in that country only after 12 years had elapsed since the gaining of independence.

On the Eve of the Aggression

The considerable difficulties which arose during the course of the legislative reinforcement of the gains made by the revolution, it would seem, should have consolidated the Grenadian revolutionaries. However, through an improbable and, perhaps, enemy-inspired confluence of circumstances a spirit of sectarianism penetrated into the ranks of the vanguard; it manifested itself in a lack of trust in each other and mutual recriminations. All this led to a split in the ranks of the leadership. Events on Grenada began to develop with fateful rapidity.

After the return of the Grenadian delegation, headed by Bishop, from a trip abroad to Czechoslovakia and Hungary with a brief stop-over in Cuba on the return trip, the differences of opinion within the Grenadian leadership, which, taking everything into consideration, had arisen previously, flared up with new force. It was a matter of the differences between Bishop's followers and those who supported his deputy, B. Bord. "In fact, according to our way of thinking," noted the Declaration of the Communist Party and Revolutionary Government of Cuba, "this was more of a conflict of personalities and concepts about methods of leadership than a profound conflict; other subjective factors were also relevant."

The Bord group achieved a preponderance in the basic units of the state and party apparatus; Bishop was removed by the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement from the posts which he held, and on 13 October he was placed under house arrest. On the morning of 19 October a demonstration in the thousands was organized in support of Bishop, who enjoyed enormous popularity among the people, and he was freed. However, an armed detachment sent by the Bord group opened fire on the demonstrators. Since they were in the front ranks, Bishop, Whiteman, the minister of education, Jacqueline Craft, the first deputy chairman of the General Trade Union Center of Grenadian Workers, Vincent Noel, the minister of housing construction, Morris Bain, and the general secretary of the Trade Union of Agricultural Workers, Fitz-Roy Bain, were all killed.

It was difficult even to imagine that the conflict among revolutionaries who had known each other since their youthful years could have been resolved in such a form. In particular, when they were youths as far back as 1962 (Bishop was not yet even 18) they headed up the Assembly of Youth for Truth and Justice, and during their student years they carried on an active correspondence between themselves for the purpose of creating a militant mass organization, capable of overthrowing the dictatorship. Moreover, on 12 March 1979 Gairy had drawn up a list of "unreliable persons," who were subject to physical liquidation. The entire leadership nucleus of the New Jewel Movement was on this list.

The split in the ranks of the Grenadian leadership and the tragic death of its best part impells one to think about the possibility that there was an infiltration into the ranks of the revolutionaries of elements alien to the movement, elements which stirred up differences of opinion. These fateful events prompted the Communist Party and the Revolutionary Government of Cuba to remind us, in its Declaration concerning the Events in Grenada that no crime can be committed in the name of the revolution and liberty.

After the death of Bishop and his associates power in the country passed to the military council headed by M. Austin. The bloody denouement of the differences of opinion within the leadership acutely weakened the already small defensive potential of Grenada, for the masses were demoralized by the improbable outcome of events.

The genuine threat of American aggression hung over Grenada. The emergence of sectarian tendencies in the leadership of the Grenadian revolution was already in itself fraught with a menacing danger, because for Reagan it was utterly unimportant who was heading up Grenada's government. For him the main thing was something else--not to allow any pretext whatsoever, even if absolutely

artificial, to slip by without gaining a "military victory" on the eve of the election campaign in the United States. A pretext was found without any lengthy thoughts--the "rescue" of the American citizens (to whom the new Grenadian leadership had given full and substantial guarantees of safety!). The essence of the imperial policy was revealed--under any pretext, by resorting to force, to impose their own dictates and obedient governments.

Reagan Takes Off His Mask

After the death of Bishop Reagan issued an order to create a "working group" for evaluating the situation in Grenada, i.e., for preparing a direct aggression into this country. On 21 October an American armada consisting of the aircraft-carrier Independence with 70 airplanes on board, the helicopter-carrier Guan, 5 support ships, and a special military-landing group of 5 ships with 1900 marines on board, "destined" for Lebanon, changed course and headed for the shores of Grenada. During the course of the intervention itself it was supplemented by "fresh" forces.

In a parallel, urgent procedure the White House knocked together an alliance consisting of those states which were prepared to cover up the nakedness of Reagan's aggression. On 22 October 1983 in Port-of-Spain (Trinidad and Tobago) a special conference was convened of the heads of governments of the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), whereat consideration was given to the question on imposing sanctions on Grenada; the latter, moreover, though a member of this community, was not invited to the conference. There was no time for this--because, of course, the armada was already enroute! Among these sanctions were the dropping of Grenada's membership in CARICOM, the breaking off of official ties, the abrogation of regional commercial privileges, the cessation of air and sea communications. Nevertheless, the countries belonging to CARICOM did not reach a unanimous agreement as to the interference in Grenada's internal affairs. Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, and the Bahamas were opposed to military intervention.

As dictated by the United States, a group of countries belonging to CARICOM and, at the same time, forming an independent organization--the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), on Sunday, 23 October sent off something Reagan had been waiting for a long time--an "official and urgent request" for aid. Not the last role in this "initiative" was played by the 60-year-old Mademoiselle Eugenia Charles, the prime minister of Dominica, although the Charter of the OECS (which, by the way, is not registered in the proper manner in the UN) provides for requests for aid to other states only in case of external aggression. Also deserving of attention is the fact that eight months prior to the intervention at the above-mentioned conference of heads of governments of the Commonwealth member-states a communique was written by the members of the OECS, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as Barbados and Jamaica. It stated as follows: "The heads of governments affirm their point of view that each state should be allowed to follow its own path of political, economic, and social development without any sort of external interference, compulsion, dictates, or pressure."

At dawn on 25 October the American aggressors began their long-planned aggression, having drawn into participating in it the following new mini-aggressors:

Jamaica, Barbados, Domenica, Antigua, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent (in all, about 300 men, which comprised from 50 to 65 percent of the present number of the armed forces of these states).

The scenario and rehearsal for this aggression had been worked out as far back as 1981 at the time of the large-scale NATO exercises in the Caribbean Sea known as the "Ocean Venture-81." During one phase of these exercises the Puerto Rican Island of Vieques became "Grenada." This operation was assigned the code name "Ember and Ember Rains," by which was understood a government "exporting terrorism" and receiving external aid for this. According to the plans of the operation's authors, its conduct could be adapted to the seizure of hostages for terroristic purposes on the part of "Ember and Ember Rains." During the course of the training exercises on the Island of Vieques the group of "hostages" consisted of 30 American citizens. It is not difficult to trace the analogy with the American students who, as Reagan stated on the eve of the intervention in Grenada, had become (supposedly) "hostages" of the new authorities.

Under the pretext of freeing the "hostages," the forces taking part in Operation "Ember and Ember Rains" were supposed to thrust into the island, overthrow the government, set up a "friendly regime," and occupy the territory until new "elections," with a promise to quit the country after such elections were held. The "new government," having, in turn quelled the "domestic and international subversive activity," would request the countries participating in the operation to leave their military units there. Thus, Washington worked out a scenario for aggression in Grenada and the creation of a new military base in the Caribbean Basin.

The U.S. aggression in Grenada, although all its phases have not yet transpired, is developing, as it is easy enough to see, precisely in accordance with this scenario. However, the intervention in Grenada did not turn out to be for Reagan as easy as a two-hour stroll. The aggressors were compelled to include in their military actions the elite 82nd Airborne Division. American losses obviously exceeded the "plans" of the American generals.

Reagan had recourse to an open falsification of the facts in order to present in a rosy (but, as it turned out, a bloody) light the "rescue operation" of the U.S. armed forces. He succeeded--let's hope, only temporarily--in implanting a chauvinistic mood in the average American. In order to achieve a monopoly on explaining the events in a tone suitable to him, Reagan imposed a ban on journalists having any access to Grenada during the time of the invasion. The "Fourth Estate" in the United States proved helpless in the face of the official self-praise. Well, the time has come to "sober up" from the Grenadan "successes."

The world community was diametrically opposed in its attitude toward the imperial policy of force. Public opinion and the official circles of the overwhelming majority of the world's states condemned Washington's interventionist actions, characterizing them as an attempt to introduce the "law of the jungle" into international relations. Even the principal allies of the United States in NATO expressed their disagreement, in one form or another, with the actions of the White House. Characteristic in this connection was the declaration by Thatcher --the only foreign official leader whom Reagan "advised" of his plans on the eve of the aggression. "I am decisively opposed to communism and terrorism,

but if the United States is going to interfere in all corners where communism is dominant...then," she remarked, "there will be frightful wars in the world."

The overwhelming majority of Latin American states condemned Reagan's actions. It turned out to be "incomprehensible" in the OAS. It was from such points of view that the countries of this region spoke out at the extraordinary plenary session of the UN General Assembly which was convoked for an urgent discussion of the question of putting an end to the American aggression, which was a crude violation of the norms of international law. As is known, 108 states voted for such a resolution, while the United States, accompanied only by 9 flexible, dictatorial regimes, voted against it.

Moreover, the world community has expressed dissatisfaction in connection with the fact that the condemnation of Washington's aggressive actions, which won a "battle" with a country 27,000 times smaller than itself, has had no principled importance for Reagan. As events have shown, he has also ignored the position of his own chief allies in NATO and has conceived new adventures. In particular, he has declared that he would undertake analogous measures "with regard to other countries if such possibilities occurred."

But no matter how events develop, one thing is perfectly obvious: the use of force by the United States is testimony to its political weakness. Crude force, hegemonism in world politics evokes universal condemnation and, furthermore, the determination to struggle, a readiness for self-sacrifice for the sake of liberty, justice, and happiness of future generations. It was precisely for this that the Grenadians struggled who gave their own lives in fighting for their homeland. It was precisely for this that those 24 Cuban patriots also fought who died on Grenada, defending it against the attack of the American landing forces.

Under present-day conditions, when force has been elevated to the rank of an official U.S. policy, the unity of the revolutionary and liberation forces is capable of putting up a powerful barrier to all forms of imperialist provocations, blackmail, and aggression.

St. George's--Havana

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2384

CSO: 1807/159

INTERNATIONAL

FOREIGN POLICY COORDINATION BY WARSAW PACT MEMBERS VIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 84 p 5

/S. Zamyatin: "In the Name of a Great Goal"/

/Excerpt/ Under the current conditions, the consistent course of fraternal socialist countries in strengthening the unity and solidarity of their ranks and the further development of political and military cooperation takes on even more significance. As Comrade K U. Chernenko noted at the February 1984 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "the success in preserving and strengthening peace will largely depend on how great the influence of socialist countries will be in the world arena, how active, purposeful and coordinated their actions will be." The comprehensive cooperation of socialist community states based on the principles of socialist internationalism in the common struggle for peace and total security is an important factor in contemporary international relations.

The Warsaw Pact Organization holds a central place in realizing the collective efforts of socialist countries in defending socialism's achievements and averting the threat of nuclear war. Created by European socialist countries to guard the peaceful work of their peoples, this defensive military-political union has been for almost 30 years not only a durable and reliable shield for the socialist community but also an effective instrument for coordinating the peace-loving foreign policy of the Warsaw Pact states.

The signing of the Warsaw Pact announced the beginning of a principally new stage in the process of forming a single foreign policy line for the fraternal countries. The practice of agreed-upon action in the foreign policy area within the framework of bilateral treaties as formed in the initial postwar period is now being done on a multilateral treaty basis. What has emerged is the ability to transition from an agreement on separate steps in the international arena to the systematic and comprehensive coordination of their foreign policy by the Warsaw Pact states and the development of a single foreign policy strategy.

The mechanism of political reciprocity developed within the framework of the Warsaw Pact provides regularity and high dynamics to socialist foreign policy. The forms and methods of cooperation developed by the common effort allow them to harmonically combine the national interests of each of the socialist states with the international interests of the whole community.

The Political Consultative Committee /PKK/ plays the primary role in coordinating foreign policy activity of the fraternal countries and in collectively determining their course in the international arena and their agreement on initiatives and specific steps. It also ensures a regular exchange of opinions and information. Senior party and state leaders of the allied countries participate in the committee's work. Each of the 18 PKK conferences that took place last year invariably gave new impetus to the peaceful offensive of socialism's diplomacy. Many of the initiatives advanced at PKK conferences are at the foundation of decisions made by large international forums and have found their own expression in important bilateral intergovernmental agreements.

Meetings of the Committee of Foreign Affairs ministers, which was established in 1976, have become another important element of political reciprocity among Warsaw Pact member-states. The exchange of opinions and information on foreign political issue, the preparation of recommendations for the PKK and the development of practical measures for putting its decisions into action are all functions of this committee. Committee activity in many ways helps the fraternal countries to increase the effectiveness of coordinating their steps in the international arena and gives this coordination stability and a planned character.

Of great significance are also the periodic meetings of deputy ministers of foreign affairs and the traditionally close cooperation by socialist countries' representatives at the United Nations and other international organizations. The delegations from the fraternal countries to various international conferences are successfully interacting. Recently Warsaw Pact countries have improved the practice of collectively developing specific joint proposals on urgent problems. Bilateral political cooperation continues to play an important role in formulating the collective foreign policy of the socialist countries.

The basic direction of Warsaw Pact states' foreign policy cooperation has been and remains the struggle to create an atmosphere of security and cooperation and to end the arms race both in Europe and in the whole world.

"The historic service of the socialist countries' diplomacy is the joint development of a program to guarantee security and establish peaceful cooperation in Europe and the tireless efforts in bringing these programs to fruition. The Warsaw Pact states were the very first to promote the idea of an all-European conference on security and cooperation in Europe. The persistent and purposeful efforts by socialist countries to implement this important initiative led to the convening of such a conference, which as is known, took place in Helsinki in 1975. This created the real foundation for the subsequent development of good-neighborly relationships and mutually advantageous cooperation among the governments and peoples based on the principle of peaceful coexistence.

The coordinated foreign policy activity of the socialist states has recently been aimed at decisively repulsing the imperialist and reactive forces which with the advent of the 1970's and 1980's began an open counterattack against detente and international cooperation and against the improvement of the political situation in Europe that had begun in Helsinki. As far back as May 1979, a meeting of the Warsaw Pact states' Committee of Foreign Affairs Ministers proposed the convening of an all-European Conference at the political level to

discuss measures for strengthening trust and reducing the concentration of armed forces and weapons on the continent. However it took several years of persistent and complicated struggle to accomplish this joint proposal by the socialist countries. The fact that the Conference on Measures of Increasing Trust and Security and Disarmament in Europe finally did become a reality was a major victory for socialist diplomacy.

The countries of the Warsaw Pact arrived at the Stockholm conference firmly intending to consistently hold the line on reducing tension and reaching agreements which would actually serve to consolidate the foundations of peace and security in Europe, lower the level of military opposition and strengthen trust among the states. "We will uphold the position of peace among states and peoples here and reach the point where the conference will make a significant contribution to correcting interstate relationships and further cessation of the reckless arms race," stated A. A. Gromyko, USSR minister of foreign affairs, while speaking at the conference opening.

Even at the first session of the Stockholm conference, socialist countries showed the fullest political will and feeling of responsibility for the fate of peace in Europe. They proposed a whole complex of large-scale initiatives directed at creating an atmosphere of trust which the United States is now so persistently trying to undermine with its adventuristic actions. Among those initiatives the proposal that states possessing atomic weapons follow the example of the Soviet Union and commit themselves not to be the first to use those weapons has special significance. An important step would also have been concluding an agreement on the mutual nonapplication of military force and the support of peaceful relationships. Accomplishing only these two proposals could have made an effective contribution to strengthening trust and security on the European continent. At the same time socialist countries proposed a number of other measures. They also declared their own readiness to support any other proposal that was really aimed at practically reducing military opposition in Europe and that did not pursue the goal of attaining a unilateral advantage.

The problems of European security are inseparably linked with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. Warsaw Pact states have always considered general and complete disarmament as the most reliable path to eliminating the military threat. The USSR and its allies have repeatedly come out with specific joint proposals aimed at bridling the arms race and at disarmament. It was precisely socialist country foreign policy initiatives which in the 1960's and 1970's gave life to a whole series of international treaties and agreements such as the ones on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, on banning nuclear weapons testing in three mediums, on banning deployment of mass destruction weapons on ocean and sea floors, on banning bacteriological weapons, and also the Soviet-American Treaty on Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the agreement on Strategic Arms Limitation.

However the measures on restraining the tempo of growth in military arsenals adopted so far are clearly not sufficient. As the United States and NATO, pursuing the goal of military superiority over socialist countries, have begun working toward completing new militaristic programs of an unprecedented scale, the necessity of resolving this task has become more urgent than ever before.

Warsaw Pact states are doing everything possible so as not to allow the international situation to deteriorate and are guarding the path to nuclear war. The Prague Political Declaration and the Moscow Joint Statement, as well as documents from the April and October 1983 meetings of the Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers had a clear and constructive program in the struggle to preserve peace, the single real alternative to slipping into a nuclear catastrophe. Socialist countries are calling for immediate action to take specific steps aimed at reaching mutually acceptable understanding on such pressing problems as freezing nuclear arsenals and a complete and general ban on nuclear testing. Proposals were made in the area of a chemical weapons ban and, as a first step, the banning of such weapons in Europe. Warsaw Pact states are insisting on the quickest solution to the issue of banning neutron and radiological weapons and reducing military budgets. Measures on preventing the militarization of space which they have proposed are taking on an ever growing urgency.

Warsaw Pact countries are speaking out resolutely for the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and for the removal of both intermediate range and tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. In this regard they have made only one condition, namely, that the principle of equality and equal security be steadfastly observed.

The peaceful initiatives of socialist countries in the area of disarmament find wider support in the international arena each day. In particular, the results of the 38th UN General Assembly convincingly demonstrated this.

Solid peace and the reliable security of peoples was and continues to be the unchangeable, prime goal of socialist foreign policy. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries, closely coordinating their foreign policy efforts, are conducting a tireless fight towards this goal against the forces of imperialism and reaction in the international arena. They are firmly and consistently carrying out the Leninist policy of peace which answers the basic interests of peoples of all countries and they don't intend to move one step away from this policy.

12511

CSO: 1807/196

INTERNATIONAL

ARMENIAN ECONOMIC EXHIBITION OPENS IN FRANCE

GP211304 Yerevan SOVETAKAN AYASTAN in Armenian 1 May 84 p 3

[Excerpts] The Armenian SSR science, technics and economic exhibition was held at the aviation, textile and chemical industry, instrument building and electo-technics center of Villeurbanne, a suburb of the French city of Lyon from 13 to 27 April. It was organized by the USSR State Committee of Science and Technics and the Soviet Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

The Armenian SSR delegation was chaired by Y. Y. Khodzhamiryan, deputy chairman of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and V. B. Fanarchyan, vice president and academician of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences. In addition a special tour group arrived in France which comprised the republic's national economy specialists, scientists and cultural workers.

The exhibition introduced to the visitors the growth of industrial power, agriculture enhancement and development of research and technical discoveries in Soviet Armenia.

The opening celebration was attended by the "France-USSR" society activists, a number of French progressive organizations, the representatives of the Armenian communities in Lyon, Villeurbanne, Valence, Vienne and other cities and workers of Soviet establishments in France.

In Paris the delegation was received by (Roland Leroun), member of the French Communist Party political bureau and political director of HUMANITE newspaper. He noted the extraordinary significance of such exhibitions which relate the truth about the Soviet Union.

The Lyon exhibition instilled great feelings of joy and patriotism in thousands of Armenians in France. During meetings with the representatives of the Armenian communities in Paris and Lyon, chairman of the delegation Y. Y. Khodzhamiryan made speeches on Soviet Armenia, which were heard with great interest.

INTERNATIONAL

BRIEFS

TRADE UNION MEETING IN ALMA-ATA--(KAZTAG)--Important problems of the workers movement on the Asian continent and the results and perspectives of the activity of the International Association of Metal Workers Unions in this region are being considered at a meeting of the association's bureau, which began work 24 April in Alma-Ata. Trade union representatives from 11 Asian, American and European countries are participating. R. Zommer, chairman of the association and of the Central Directorate of the GDR Metalworkers Union, opened the meeting. Participants were greeted by: K.T. Turysov, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Trade Unions Council; A.A. Kulibayev, Alma-Ata Gorispolkom chairman; and S.T. Takezhanov, Kazakh SSR minister of nonferrous metallurgy. Alain Stern (France), association general secretary, delivered a report. [Excerpt] [Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Apr 84 p 3]

CSO: 1807/207

REGIONAL

AZERBAIJAN CP CC ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC TEXTBOOK PUBLISHING

Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 1 Apr 84 p 2

[Editorial: "In the CP Central Committee of Azerbaijan"]

[Text] The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan CP adopted a decree on improving textbook publication of the political and economic education system in light of the demands of the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

It is noted in the decree that the demand of the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum regarding the change of the style of political enlightenment became the basis of the activity of party organizations and of all the propagandists aktivs of the republic. Important measures for further perfecting the Marxist-Leninist education and its teaching-methodological provisions were realized.

In accordance with the party congresses' decisions and the CPSU Central Committee decrees, during the recent years definite work has been carried out in the republic regarding the publication of the classic works of Marxism-Leninism, Communist Party and the Soviet state documents, as well as textbooks, teaching-methodological and informational materials for the political and economic education system. The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan CP adopted a special decree regarding the status and the measures for improvement of translating work in the republic.

The works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin, the materials of the party congresses, CPSU Central Committee plenums, congresses of the Azerbaijan CP and republic CP Central Committee plenums, the books by K.U. Chernenko "Voprosy raboty partiynogo i gosudarstvennogo apparata" [The Questions of Work of the Party and State Bodies] and "Izbrannyye stat'i i rechi" [Selected Articles and Speeches], N.A. Tikhonov's "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], and the works of other leaders of the party and the state have been published in the Azerbaijan language. It was planned to complete the publication of "Polnoye sobranie sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works] by V.I. Lenin by the 115th birthday of V.I. Lenin. A number of textbooks and other aids are published to assist the propagandists and the students of the political and economic education system; newspapers, magazines, television and radio regularly publish materials, and the political enlightenment houses and study-rooms supply the propagandist aktiv with the necessary recommendations.

At the same time, the scientific-methodological and informational maintenance of Marxist-Leninist education requires further improvement in light of the tasks posed by the 26th party congress, the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the decrees on improving political and economic studies.

In many disciplines which are studied in the party and Komsomol [Communist Youth League] political enlightenment and economic education system there are no textbooks, programs, or visual aids in the Azerbaijan language, and the existing ones were published many years ago; the fundamental propositions developed by the latest party congresses are not reflected in them. Textbooks on such vital problems as developed socialism, economic, agrarian and social policy of the CPSU, ideological struggle in the world arena, and theory and methods of ideological work, are necessary for the party studies system. They are short on textbooks in the Komsomol political enlightenment system.

The situation regarding supplying the political and economic education system with visual and methodology materials--press, screen and sound aids--is unsatisfactory. The propaganda aktiv experiences difficulties due to the insufficiency of information-reference materials and the lack of political, economic, philosophical legal and other dictionaries and thematic handbooks in the Azerbaijan language. There is still little literature that clearly and ably propagandizes the practical experience of the organizational and ideological work of the party organizations of the country and the republic.

This situation can be explained by the absence of the necessary system and well-adjusted coordination in the business of planning and publishing the literature and other aids, and the target-oriented work regarding study-methodological and informational supplying for political and economic study.

The ministries and departments, and the branch trade union committees deal poorly in providing economic schools and seminars with developed methodological materials, the materials regarding the problems and tasks of branches of the people's economy, the front-rank production experience, and the scientific and technological achievements. The work of the editorial boards of newspapers and magazines, radio and television needs perfecting in assisting propagandists and audiences.

The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan CP obliged the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan CP, the party obkoms, gorkoms, ASPS [Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions], the Komsomol Central Committee of the republic, ministries and departments, to substantially improve providing the political and economic education with the study-methodological and informational materials, especially those in the Azerbaijan language. This work should be viewed as the necessary prerequisite for the increase in the ideological-theoretical and professional level of cadres.

The House of the Political Enlightenment of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee is entrusted to coordinate the work of the corresponding institutions and departments regarding the planning and organizing provision of the political and economic education system with the study-methodological and informational materials; to control, first of all, the planned and timely publication of

textbooks, visual and methodological aids and other materials in correspondence with the demands of the political and economic education system, as well as books on the experience and problems in propaganda and agitation work.

The Azerbaijan SSR Goskomizdat [State Committee on Publications] is obliged to fully consider the demands of the system of party and Komsomol political enlightenment and economic education of workers and to mandatorily meet the conditions and schedule of the planned literature publication, when considering the plans for publishing houses every year. It is necessary to compose a combined topic plan for the 1984/85 school year dealing with the publication of textbooks and study programs on the problems of developed socialism, scientific-technical progress, the brigade forms of labor organization, visual aids, dictionaries and reference materials, on the basis of the publishing houses "Azerneshr," "Gyandzhlik" and "Ishyg."

The Academy of Sciences, Goskomizdat, the main editorial board of the Azerbaijan Soviet Encyclopedia, the Institute of Party History of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee and the Minvuz [The Ministry of Higher Education] of the republic must work out and realize the program for the Azerbaijan language publication of the necessary reference-encyclopedia literature in the near future, including political, economic, philosophical, legal and other dictionaries.

Goskino of the Azerbaijan SSR is obliged to establish a planned production of slides and slide tapes for the political and economic education system by way of dubbing from the Russian language and creating new ones, to improve the issuing and propaganda of the educational movies on specialized topics, and to regularly publish annotated indices on the scientific-popular, documentary and technical movies for their utilization in the political and economic education system.

The republic society "Znaniye" [Knowledge] is required to take measures for supplying the republic people's universities with study plans, programs and other materials in the Azerbaijan and Russian languages; the Republic Soviet of People's Universities is entrusted to supply the people's universities of their type by ministries and departments with the necessary study plans, programs and other materials.

Gosteleradio of the republic and the editorial boards of the republic newspapers and magazines must improve the quality, regularity and subject orientation of the materials to help the propagandists and listeners.

12404

CSO: 1830/409

REGIONAL

CONSTRUCTION TEMPO INCREASED AT MUUGA HARBOR PROJECT

Tallinn RAHVA HAAL in Estonian 10 Apr 84 p 2

/Article by Tonis Toom: "Spring During Construction of Tallinn's New Harbor"/

/Text "To set into operation a wharf for mineral construction goods in Tallinn's New Harbor for the 67th anniversary of the Great October..." (From the socialist pledges of the workers of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic for the year 1984)

"Here now is the wharf which is spoken about in the republic socialist pledges," indicated Aleksandr Djundik, district director of the 423rd construction management committee of the trust "Baltmorgidrostroy," as we arrived at the western edge of the construction ground. "As you see, reinforcement of the wharf railing is now coming to an end, and the filling in of the area behind it is taking place. A beginning has already been made with the preparation of the foundation for the portal crane."

The rapid setting into operation of the wharf under discussion is necessary for the smooth furnishing of Tallinn's New Harbor with building materials and structures. Ships transporting cargo for Finland's harbor builders working here on the basis of an agreement are starting to arrive at the wharf. As a matter of fact, materials and equipment are being brought right out by sea to the construction ground—for the time being, on this very spot, adjacent smaller wharves, which will later be at the disposal of the harbor fleet, are being used for their reception.

"We are still hard at work on the establishment of this wharf, but we will come through for the date anticipated in the pledges. Do not have any doubt about it," affirms brigade leader Vadim Podlutnoy, who directs the work here.

Almost half of the work capacity exerted on the construction of the harbor last year was credited to the dredging crews, who deepened the sea bottom and with the soil taken from there filled the portion of the

bay which goes under the harbor. A couple of months ago ice forced the dredging ships to leave the Muuga Bay, but winter was not able to restrain the builders on the shore--in the first quarter of this year there was construction worth 2.3 million rubles (by nearly 400,000 rubles over the plan).

Behind the wharf for building materials the protective western jetty--which is still getting longer--extends from this side of the harbor basin to a distance of about 700 meters into the sea. The floating crane--with the help of which steel piles are driven into the bottom of the bay--standing in the crumbled, drifting ice marks the jetty's final length 800 meters away from its present tip. There the jetty heads, which have to be particularly strong, are being set up.

On the shore the ferroconcrete framework for the buildings of the provisional construction base has risen to the height of a two-story house. According to the plan, the living and engineering complex must go into operation by the end of the current year. Work is progressing, but the builders complain that this object is being unequally furnished with ferroconcrete components and for that reason the construction tempo is slower than recommended.

Laying the foundation of the wharves and the jetties is proceeding, however, as planned. If the paucity of cars sporadically disturbed work last year, there are enough vehicles now. Ten-ton dump trucks constantly make their way to the construction ground; each one has a load of limestone on it or a four-pronged concrete whopper with roundish forms, which the builders call by a special name (with them the sides of the jetties and the shore railing are protected from the waves).

We drove to the other edge of the construction arena, up to the eastern jetty. The Nikolay Vinogradov brigade complex is working there.

We became acquainted with this brigade: "One of the finer collectives of the construction management committee, to which the fulfillment of the most difficult and most responsible tasks are entrusted."

Last year the Nikolay Vinogradov brigade started laying the foundation for the building materials wharf, but when the work there began to go well, these men were brought to the eastern jetty, where they began to make preparations for the construction of wharf 13. This wharf, which is planned for receiving cargo destined for the cold-storage building, should be ready in 1986. Laying the foundation for wharf 8, which is designed for loading grain, is beginning this year too.

By and large, the spring of 1984 has begun successfully with the construction of Tallinn's New Harbor. With the weather warming up the construction tempo ought to pick up even more, because the year plan is intense. The main contractor, the 423rd construction management committee, just by itself should do construction worth 8 million rubles, together with the subcontractors, however, more than 11 million rubles.

"Right now there are roughly 150 builders on the grounds, for the completion of the yearly tasks considerably greater workforce is needed, of course," stated district director Aleksandr Djundik. "We have been promised help, too. Next month one division of the trust 'Sevzapgidrostroy, will be sent here from Leningrad together with the machinery. They will start to build wharf 11. Our republic's Komsomol organization has also promised to make its contribution in due time to the setting into operation of the harbor as well as the Komsomol's shock construction objects. The plan is to form a separate construction division from the youths arriving with the Komsomol's delegation letter."

The above-mentioned concerns our builders. Last year, however, an agreement was signed with Finnish construction firms, for whom the tasks remain of erecting the harbor's elevators, cold-storage buildings and several other edifices. The first representatives of the foreign firms are now present and preparing the workplaces for more extensive construction operations. We can thus assume that this year the construction tempo of Tallinn's New Harbor will favorably begin to pick up speed from month to month.

12327

CSO: 1815/33

REGIONAL

ARMENIAN BRANCH OF ORIENTALIST SOCIETY FORMED

Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 17 Apr 84 p 4

/ARMENPRESS Report: "The Armenian Branch of the All-Union Association of Orientalists"

/Text/ The republic's small scientific subdivisions have been augmented by yet another as the Armenian branch of the All-Union Association of Orientalist has been formed.

The USSR Association of Orientalists, founded in 1980, was started to facilitate the study of the history of social concepts, law, politics, language, literature, written memorials, geography and culture of oriental countries and peoples on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory and methodology. It is also to facilitate establishing the Soviet Union's policy of friendship with peoples from Asia and the whole world, the improvement of relations between peoples of the Soviet Union and the East, their cooperation and also the battle against racial, national, religious and any other type of discrimination and oppression.

Academician A. Yioannisyan, vice president of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, opened the constituent assembly with introductory remarks.

G. Sarkisyan, chairman of the organizing committee and correspondent member of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, gave a report entitled "The Rise of Oriental Studies in the Armenian SSR."

He said, "Armenian oriental studies have a long and rich history. The Armenian people for a thousand years have closely associated with neighboring peoples and supported contact with the different peoples in the world. As a result, very rich material on the history and culture of contiguous people have been accumulated in the Armenian people's treasure house of spiritual culture.

The victory of Soviet power in Armenia allowed the Armenian people to find a state system and establish their own scientific centers. Yerevan University, founded in 1920, had already begun teaching the discipline of oriental studies 3 years later. A separate department was subsequently formed here and after the Academy of Sciences was established, the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies was formed in 1971.

During those years several dozen monographs and collections on oriental studies were published, the training of a professional orientalist cadre was set in motion and a special oriental library created which houses approximately 40,000 volumes, including a number of unique foreign printings.

Deputy Director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies Professor V. Solntsev, director of the Matenadaran Department, Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Papazyan, dean of Yerevan University Oriental Studies Department, Candidate of Philological Sciences M. Kochar, director of the Department of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History, Doctor of Historical Sciences R. Bartikyan and others spoke at the constituent assembly.

Elections for the Armenian branch of the All-Union Association of Orientalists officers were held.

The director of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute for Oriental Studies and corresponding member of the republic's Academy of Sciences, G. Sarkisyan, was elected chairman of the Armenian branch of the Association.

The Armenian CP Central Committee director of the Department of Information and Foreign Relations, L. Manaseryan, and the Armenian SSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, G. Kirakosyan, took part in the constituent assembly of the branch.

12511

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